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Abstract 
This thesis concerns the computational problem of finding one Nash equilibrium of a 
bimatrix game, a two-player game in strategic form. Bimatrix games are among the most 
basic models in non-cooperative game theory, and finding a Nash equilibrium is important 
for their analysis. 
The Lemke—Howson algorithm is the classical method for finding one Nash equilib-
rium of a bimatrix game. In this thesis, we present a class of square bimatrix games 
for which this algorithm takes, even in the best case, an exponential number of steps in 
the dimension d of the game. Using polytope theory, the games are constructed using 
pairs of dual cyclic polytopes with 2d suitably labelled facets in d-space. The construc-
tion is extended to two classes of non-square games where, in addition to exponentially 
long Lemke—Howson computations, finding an equilibrium by support enumeration takes 
exponential time on average. 
The Lemke—Howson algorithm, which is a complementary pivoting algorithm, finds 
at least one solution to the linear complementarity problem (LCP) derived from a bimatrix 
game. A closely related complementary pivoting algorithm by Lemke solves more general 
LCPs. A unified view of these two algorithms is presented, for the first time, as far as we 
know. Furthermore, we present an extension of the standard version of Lemke's algorithm 
that allows one more freedom than before when starting the algorithm. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In Section 1.1, we briefly describe some background material required for understanding 
this introductory chapter. In Section 1.2, we describe the contribution of this thesis. In 
Section 1.3, we describe the structure of this thesis, and give details of where some of the 
results have already been published. In Section 1.4, we describe related work. 
1.1 Background 
This thesis concerns the computational problem of finding one Nash equilibrium of a 
bimatrix game; we call this problem NASH. Bimatrix games are among the most basic 
models in non-cooperative game theory, and finding a Nash equilibrium is important for 
their analysis. 
A bimatrix game is a two-player game in strategic form. The strategic form is spec-
ified by a finite set of players, a finite set of "pure" strategies for each player, and a (for 
simplicity of input, integer) payoff for each player for each strategy profile (which is a tu-
ple of strategies, one for each player). The game is played by each player independently 
and simultaneously choosing one strategy, whereupon the players receive their respective 
payoffs. A player is allowed to randomize according to a probability distribution on his 
pure strategy set, which defines a mixed strategy for that player. Players are then interested 
in maximizing their expected payoffs. A Nash equilibrium is a profile of (possibly mixed) 
strategies such that no player can gain by unilaterally choosing a different strategy, where 
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the other strategies in the profile are kept fixed. Every strategic form game has at least one 
equilibrium in mixed strategies (Nash (1951)). For two players, the game is specified by 
two m x n integer matrices A and B, where the m rows are the pure strategies i of player 1 
and the n columns the pure strategies j of player 2, with resulting matrix entries aii and 
bid as payoffs to player 1 and 2, respectively. This is called a bimatrix game (A, B). 
In computer science, the running time of a program is measured as a function of the 
size of the input; for the problem NASH, this is the number of bits required to specify the 
payoff matrices. Problems that can be solved in polynomial running time are considered 
as "computationally tractable" (see Garey and Johnson (1979), Papadimitriou (1994a)). 
At present, it is not known whether NASH can be solved in polynomial time. This has been 
called one of the two "most important concrete open questions" in theoretical computer 
science (Papadimitriou (2001)). A recent preprint of Chen and Deng (2005b), discussed 
in Section 5.1, suggests that a polynomial-time algorithm for NASH is unlikely to exist. 
Currently, not even a subexponential algorithm for the problem is known. 
An equilibrium of a zero-sum bimatrix game (A,B), where B = —A, is the solution 
to a linear program (LP). Linear programs can be solved in polynomial time by the ellip-
soid method or interior point methods (see Todd (2001) for a survey). No such method 
is known for finding Nash equilibria. One difficulty is that the set of Nash equilibria of 
a bimatrix game is generally not convex. Problems relating to that set tend to be com-
putationally difficult, for example the problem of deciding whether a game has a unique 
Nash equilibrium (Gilboa and Zemel (1989), Conitzer and Sandholm (2003), Codenotti 
and Stefankovi6 (2005)). Finding all equilibria is therefore computationally intractable 
for larger games. 
1.2 The contribution of this thesis 
A standard method for NASH is the algorithm due to Lemke and Howson (1964), here 
called the LH algorithm. The algorithm, which is described in Section 2.2, provides an 
elementary and constructive proof that a bimatrix game has at least one Nash equilib-
rium. The first result of this thesis is a class of square games where this algorithm takes 
an exponential number of steps, which shows that the algorithm is not polynomial. The 
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LH algorithm is a pivoting method related to the simplex algorithm for linear program-
ming (Dantzig (1963)). Klee and Minty (1972) constructed linear programs for which the 
simplex method with a certain pivot rule takes an exponential number of pivoting steps; 
similar examples have been constructed for other pivot rules (see Klee and Kleinschmidt 
(1987), Todd (2001)). The LH algorithm has no choice of its pivot rule, but a free choice, 
corresponding to a pure strategy of one of the players, of its first step (the first variable 
"to enter the basis"). In the games constructed here, the running time of the LH algorithm 
is exponential even for the best first choice of the algorithm. To our knowledge, these are 
the first examples of this kind. Finding a Nash equilibrium in subexponential time must 
therefore go beyond this classic pivoting approach. 
Our construction uses the theory of polyhedra (see for example Ziegler (1995) or 
Griinbaum (2003)). This geometric view gives a good insight into the structure of Nash 
equilibria of two-player games (see von Stengel (2002)). For each player, the set of his 
mixed strategies together with the best response payoff to the other player is described by 
a polyhedron. A vertex of each polyhedron is obtained by converting some inequalities 
into equations, which describe the support of a mixed strategy and its best responses. 
An equilibrium is given by a "complementary" vertex pair. The LH algorithm traverses 
"almost complementary" edges of the polyhedra until it reaches an equilibrium. 
We use a standard construction of "dual cyclic polytopes". These are polyhedra for 
which the vertex-defining inequalities are known in arbitrary dimension (Gale (1963)). 
This purely combinatorial information can also be used to construct bimatrix games with 
many equilibria (von Stengel (1999)). In our construction, since both players have dual 
cyclic polytopes as their best response polyhedra, we call these in x n games the double 
cyclic polytope games F(m,n), and in particular the square games just mentioned F(d, d). 
The LH paths are defined purely combinatorially in terms of the supports of, and best 
responses to, the mixed strategies that they trace. These correspond to known binary 
patterns that encode the vertices of dual cyclic polytopes. Linear recurrences for the 
various path lengths give rise to their exponential growth. For d = 2, 4, 6, ..., the length of 
the longest path for a d x d game F(d, d) is given by every third Fibonacci number, which 
is proportional to 03d/2 , where 4 = 1.618... is the Golden Ratio. Shorter path lengths are 
obtained by certain sums of these numbers, the shortest length being proportional to 0 3d/4 . 
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The construction described so far is closely related to Morris (1994), who used dual 
cyclic polytopes to produce exponentially long "Lemke paths" on polytopes. These paths 
correspond to a "symmetric" version of the LH algorithm, which finds symmetric equilib-
ria of a symmetric game (although Morris did not consider this interpretation). The games 
obtained from Morris's construction have additional nonsymmetric equilibria. The stan-
dard LH algorithm always terminates, very quickly, at such a nonsymmetric equilibrium. 
These games are therefore not directly useful for our purpose of providing "challenge in-
stances" for the problem NASH. After we found our construction of long LH paths for 
the bimatrix games F(d, d), McLennan and Tourky (2005) noted an ingenious alterna-
tive proof of exponentially long LH paths based on Morris's construction and imitation 
games, as explained in Section 3.7. An imitation game is a square game (A, /), where 
I is the identity matrix. It is closely related to the symmetric game (A,A T ), since its 
symmetric equilibria correspond to the equilibrium strategies of player 2 in the imitation 
game. 
The square games F(d, d) have a unique, completely mixed equilibrium, as do the 
square games derived from Morris (1994) by McLennan and Tourky (2005). In both 
cases, the LH algorithm needs exponential time to find this equilibrium. However, for both 
games the equilibrium is quickly found by a simple algorithm called support enumeration 
(e.g., Dickhaut and Kaplan (1991), Porter, Nudelman, and Shoham (2004), or Barány, 
Vempala, and Vetta (2005)). The support of a mixed strategy is the set of pure strategies 
that it plays with positive probability. All pure strategies in the support of an equilibrium 
strategy must have equal expected payoff. If, as here, the game is nondegenerate, the 
corresponding linear equations uniquely determine the mixed strategy probabilities of the 
other player. Support enumeration considers possible supports for both players and the 
solutions to the respective linear equations, and checks if these define an equilibrium. In 
a square game, it is natural to test the set of all pure strategies as an equilibrium support, 
which gives the equilibrium in the two classes of square games mentioned so far. That 
is, both our square games F(d,d) and the square imitation games derived from Morris's 
construction are not "hard to solve" by other methods. 
Therefore, we extend each of these two constructions to give two classes of non-
square games where both the LH algorithm and, on average, support enumeration are 
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exponential. It appears that no general algorithm for NASH is known that can solve either 
of these classes of games efficiently, so we consider them both as classes of hard-to-solve 
bimatrix games. The first class are the d x 2d double cyclic polytope games F(d, 2d), 
with the columns of the payoff matrices randomly permuted. For the second class, we 
construct 3d x d games T(d) with one dual cyclic polytope and a simplotope, which is a 
product of simplices, here of d tetrahedra. This construction is inspired by Morris (1994) 
and McLennan and Tourky (2005). We call these games triple imitation games, due to 
their connection to imitation games. 
One reason for presenting two classes is that there is a tradeoff between them. The 
games F(d, 2d) have the longer LH paths, whereas the triple imitation games T(d) will 
take a greater expected number of attempts to find a Nash equilibrium by support enu-
meration. A further reason for including triple imitation games is the use of a new kind of 
polytope, the simplotope, as one of the best response polytopes for constructing games. 
Another method of finding equilibria is to enumerate the vertex pairs of the best re-
sponse polyhedra, and test them for the equilibrium property. In general, the number of 
vertices is exponential. However, there are many vertex enumeration methods (see e.g. 
Avis and Fukuda (1992) and the references therein), and we do not analyse whether they 
solve our games T(d, 2d) or T(d) in expected exponential time, although we suspect that 
this is the case. Knowing the exact way that the games F(d, 2d) and T(d) are constructed, 
it is possible to "unscramble" the hidden support by special pivoting steps, and thus arrive 
quickly at an equilibrium, as described in Section 3.6 for the games r(d, 2d). However, 
this very specialized method only applies to these constructions, and does not compute an 
equilibrium for other games. 
The Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game are solutions to a linear complementarity 
problem (LCP); see Cottle, Pang, and Stone (1992). The algorithm by Lemke (1965) 
is closely related to the LH algorithm. Whereas the LH algorithm only solves bimatrix 
games, Lemke's algorithm can solve more general LCPs. In Chapter 4, a unified view of 
these two algorithms is presented, for the first time, as far as we know. Furthermore, we 
present an extension of the standard version of Lemke's algorithm that allows one more 
freedom than before when starting the algorithm. 
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1.3 The structure of this thesis 
In this section, we describe the structure of this thesis, and give details of where some of 
the results of the thesis have already been published. 
Chapter 2 gives the relevant background material. In Section 2.1, we describe the best 
response condition, leading to the characterization of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games 
as completely labelled (complementary) vertex pairs of the best response polytopes. In 
Section 2.2, we describe a modification of the LH algorithm that finds a symmetric equi-
librium of a symmetric bimatrix game. We explain this modified and simpler LH method 
because, to our knowledge, except in Savani and von Stengel (2004; 2006), it has not 
been described earlier (although it is straightforward), and because it leads naturally to 
the usual LH method. 
In Chapter 3, we present two classes of hard-to-solve bimatrix games. In Section 3.2, 
we describe the well-understood dual cyclic polytopes, and their construction using the 
moment curve. Then, in Section 3.3, we present the class of games F(m, n). In Sec-
tion 3.4, we show that for the square games r(d, d) the length of the shortest LH path 
grows exponentially with d. In Section 3.5, we show that if we randomly permute the 
columns of the games F(d, 2d), in addition to exponentially long LH computations, find-
ing an equilibrium by support enumeration takes on average exponential time. The results 
in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 have been published in Savani and von Stengel (2004; 2006). In 
Section 3.6, we describe how to "unscramble" the random permutation and quickly find 
an equilibrium of r(d, 2d), if the rest of the construction is known. This result has ap-
peared in Savani (2004). In Section 3.7, which is taken from Savani and von Stengel 
(2006), we explain how to interpret the "Lemke paths" of Morris (1994) as paths of the 
symmetric LH algorithm described in Section 2.2. All ordinary LH paths for these sym-
metric games are very short, and lead to nonsymmetric pure-strategy equilibria. We then 
explain the use of imitation games in this context, as suggested by McLennan and Tourky 
(2005), giving another class of square games with exponentially long LH paths. Extend-
ing this, we present in Section 3.8 the new d x 3d triple imitation games T(d), which (like 
the games r(d, 2d)) are hard to solve by both support enumeration and the LH algorithm. 
The time complexity of the LH algorithm and support enumeration for all the mentioned 
classes of games is summarized in Figure 3.10. 
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In Chapter 4, we describe the algorithm by Lemke (1965). We then give a new, unified 
view of Lemke's algorithm and the LH algorithm, and an extension of Lemke's algorithm 
that allows one more freedom when starting the algorithm than before. 
In Chapter 5, we conclude our findings and discuss open questions. Appendix A gives 
a number of supplementary results. In Section A.1, we describe how to generate the 
square games F(d, d), and give an example of such a game. In doing so, we describe a 
second way to construct cyclic polytopes, the well-known trigonometric moment curve 
(see Ziegler (1995, p. 75f) or Griinbaum (2003, p. 67)). In Section A.2, we give tables of 
path lengths for all the constructed games, as well as examples of paths. A list of symbols 
is given at the end. 
1.4 Related work 
Our construction of the games F(d, d) and T(d) is related to Morris (1994). There, Mor-
ris showed that Lemke paths cannot be used to address the Hirsch conjecture (Klee and 
Kleinschmidt (1987)). This famous conjecture states a tight linear bound on the short-
est path between any two vertices of a polytope, for which the best known bounds are 
not even polynomial (Kalai and Kleitman (1992)). A polynomial pivoting algorithm for 
NASH (or even for finding a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a symmetric game, using the 
symmetrization in (2.3) below), applied to zero-sum games, would answer that question 
as well. 
Equilibria of zero-sum games are the solutions to an LP. The results by Murty (1980) 
and Goldfarb (1983; 1994) suggest that Lemke's algorithm can be exponential even when 
solving a zero-sum game. However, these results do not extend to the LH algorithm. First, 
the examples by Murty and Goldfarb define a single path of Lemke's algorithm, which 
is not an LH path. Second, even if they could be modified to define an LH path, the LP 
defines a cube like in the construction by Klee and Minty (1972). The endpoints of the 
exponentially long path on the cube are joined by a single edge. Hence, even if one could 
make the LH algorithm mimic that path, another LH path would be very short. 
As mentioned above, the Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game are solutions to a linear 
complementarity problem (LCP). In Murty (1978) and Fathi (1979), LCPs are constructed 
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where for certain pivoting methods one path is exponentially long, in analogy to Klee and 
Minty (1972). In our case, all LH paths are exponentially long. Moreover, the examples 
of Murty and Fathi do not arise from games. 
Equilibrium enumeration methods (see for example Vorob' ev (1958), Kuhn (1961), 
Winkels (1979), Jansen (1981), Audet, Hansen, Jaumard, and Savard (2001), and the 
survey in von Stengel (2002)) can be modified to terminate once the first equilibrium 
is found, and should be tested on the games constructed in this thesis as well. These 
methods are designed to produce all rather than just one equilibrium, which cannot even 
be polynomial in the output size (unless P = NP), since deciding if a game has only 
one Nash equilibrium is NP-complete (Gilboa and Zemel (1989)). There is no a priori 
reason to assume that these methods are good for finding just one equilibrium. Similarly, 
general algorithms for finding equilibria in games with any number of players are not 
likely to be fast. These include path-following algorithms (Garcia and Zangwill (1981)), 
which typically specialize to pivoting in the two-player case (for a generalization of LH 
to more than two players see Rosenmiiller (1971) and Wilson (1971)), and algorithms 
for approximating fixed points (e.g. McKelvey and McLennan (1996) and Papadimitriou 
(1994b)). 
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Chapter 2 
Bimatrix Games, Polytopes, and the 
Lemke Howson algorithm 
2.1 Nash equilibria and the best response condition 
We use the following notation. Given a bimatrix game (A,B) with m x n payoff matrices A 
and B, a mixed strategy for player 1 is a vector x in Rin with nonnegative components that 
sum to one. A mixed strategy for player 2 is such a vector y in Rn. All vectors are column 
vectors; the row vector corresponding to x is written as the transpose xT . The support of a 
mixed strategy is the set of pure strategies that have positive probability. A best response 
to y is a mixed strategy x of player 1 that maximizes his expected payoff x TAy, and a best 
response to x is a mixed strategy y of player 2 that maximizes her expected payoff xT By. 
A Nash equilibrium is a pair of mutual best responses. Best responses are characterized 
by the following combinatorial condition, which we state only for a mixed strategy x of 
player 1. 
Lemma 2.1 (Nash (1951)) Let x and y be mixed strategies of player 1 and 2, respectively. 
Then x is a best response to y if and only if all strategies in the support of x are pure best 
responses to y. 
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Proof: Let (Ay)i be the ith component of Ay, which is the expected payoff to player 1 
when playing row i. Let u = maxi(Ay)i. Then 
xTAy = Exi (ity) i 	 (Ay)i). 
i 	 i 
Since the sum Lxi(u — (Ay)i) is nonnegative, xTAy < u. The expected payoff xTAy 
achieves the maximum u if and only if that sum is zero, that is, if xi > 0 implies (Ay)i = u, 
as claimed. 	 1=1 
A game (A,B) is symmetric if A = BT , so it does not change when the players change 
C
4 
 2) 
roles. The game of "chicken" with A = BT — 	is an example. Its equilibria, in 
1 
terms of the probability vectors, are the bottom left pure strategy pair ((0, 1) T , (1,0) T ) 
with expected payoffs 4,2 to players 1 and 2, respectively, the top right pure strategy pair 
((1, 0) -1- , (0,1)T ) with expected payoffs 2, 4, and the mixed strategy pair ((1/3, 2/3) T , 
(1/3,2/3) T ) with expected payoffs 2,2. The mixed strategy equilibrium is the only sym-
metric equilibrium. Its probabilities are uniquely determined by the condition that the 
pure strategies in the support of the opponent's strategy must both be best responses (by 
Lemma 2.1) and hence have equal expected payoff. 
In a mixed equilibrium, the probabilities are uniquely given by the pair of supports 
if the corresponding sub-matrices have full rank; the support sizes are then equal. This 
holds if the game is nondegenerate, defined by the property that the number of pure best 
reponses to any mixed strategy never exceeds the size of its support (see von Stengel 
(2002) for a detailed discussion). The LH algorithm can be extended to degenerate games 
by standard lexicographic perturbation techniques, which we discuss in Section 4.3. All 
of the games we construct are nondegenerate. 
By Lemma 2.1, an equilibrium is given if any pure strategy of a player is either a 
best response (to the opponent's mixed strategy) or is played with probability zero (by 
the player himself). This can be captured by polytopes (see Ziegler (1995), Griinbaum 
(2003)) whose facets represent pure strategies, either as best responses or having proba-
bility zero. We explain first the simpler case of symmetric equilibria of a symmetric game 
with d x d payoff matrix C to player 1, say. We then extend this easily to nonsymmetric 
games. Let 
S=IzERd lz> 0, Cz<11 	 (2.1) 
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where 0 and 1 denote vectors with all entries 0 and 1, respectively, and inequalities hold 
for all components. The right hand sides of the inequality Cz < 1, which are 1, represent 
normalized payoffs, as explained in Lemma 2.2 and subsequently. We can assume that 
C is nonnegative and has no zero column by adding a constant to all payoffs, which 
does not change the best response structure, so that the polyhedron S is bounded and 
thus a polytope. We assume there are no redundant inequalities in Cz < 1, which would 
correspond to dominated strategies. Then the game is nondegenerate if and only if the 
polytope S is simple, that is, every vertex lies on exactly d facets of the polytope. A 
facet is obtained by making one of the inequalities defining the polytope binding, that is, 
by converting it into an equality. The following lemma characterizes Nash equilibria in 
terms of polytope vertices, as already shown by Vorob'ev (1958). 
Lemma 2.2 A mixed strategy pair (x,y) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game 
(C,CT) if and only ifx=y= u•zand zE S in (2.1), z 0, u=11Ei zi, and (1—Cz)= 0, 
where z must be a vertex of S by nondegeneracy. 
Proof- Let z E S, z 0 and u = 11E i zi. Then u > 0, and zu is a mixed strategy x. The 
condition Cz < 1 is equivalent to Cx < lu. The orthogonality condition zT (1— Cz) = 0 
is equivalent to xT (lu — Cx) = 0, so that for each positive component xi of x (of which 
there is at least one), (Cx)i = u= maxk(Cx)k. Thus, by Lemma 2.1, xis a best response to 
itself, that is, (x,x) is a symmetric equilibrium. Conversely, any such equilibrium (x,x), 
with u = maxk(Cx)k > 0, and z = x 1/u, gives a vector z with the stated properties. 
The vector z is on d facets of S since for each i, either zi = 0 or (Cz)i = 1. If z 
was not a vertex but on a higher-dimensional face of S, any vertex of that face would be 
on additional facets, contradicting nondegeneracy of the game as S would then not be a 
simple polytope. ❑ 
In the game of chicken above, z = (1/6, 1/3) T gives the symmetric equilibrium. The 
vector z has to be re-scaled to become a mixed strategy x. The equilibrium payoff u, 
normalized to 1 in Cz < 1, is the scaling factor. The converse mapping from x to z defines 
a projective transformation of a polyhedron representing the "upper envelope" of expected 
payoffs to the polytope S (see von Stengel (2002)). 
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2.2 The Lemke—Howson algorithm 
The conditions in Lemma 2.2 define a linear complementarity problem (LCP) (see Cottle, 
Pang, and Stone (1992)), usually stated as follows: find z so that 
z> 0, 	q+Mz> 0, 	z1- (q+Mz) = 0, 	 (2.2) 
here with data M = —C, q = 1. This LCP has a trivial solution z = 0, which is not a Nash 
equilibrium. However, 0 is an artificial equilibrium, which is the starting point of what 
we call the symmetric LH algorithm. 
Given a nondegenerate symmetric game (C,CT ), the symmetric LH algorithm finds 
a nonzero vertex z of the polytope S in (2.1) so that zi- (1 — Cz) = 0, giving a symmetric 
Nash equilibrium by Lemma 2.2. 
It is useful to label the facets of S, as done by Shapley (1974). For each pure strategy i, 
the facets defined by zi = 0 and by (Cz)i = 1 both get label i. Every vertex has the label 
of the facets it lies on. The complementarity condition i r (1 — Cz) = 0 then means that z 
is completely labelled (has all labels i), since then either zi = 0 or (Cz)i = 1 (or both, but 
this cannot occur since S is simple, so a completely labelled vertex has each label exactly 
once). 
The LH algorithm is started from the completely labelled vertex z = 0 by choosing 
one label k that is initially dropped, meaning that label k is no longer required. This is the 
only free choice of the algorithm, which from then on proceeds in a unique manner. By 
leaving the facet with label k, a unique edge is traversed whose endpoint is another vertex, 
which lies on a new facet. The label, say j, of that facet, is said to be picked up. If this is 
the missing label k, the algorithm terminates at a completely labelled vertex. Otherwise, j 
is clearly duplicate, and the next edge is (uniquely) chosen by leaving the facet that so far 
had label j, and the process is repeated. The LH method generates a sequence of k-almost 
complementary edges and vertices (having all labels except possibly k, where k occurs 
only at the starting point and endpoint). The resulting path cannot repeat a vertex as this 
would offer a second way to proceed when that vertex is first encountered, which is not 
the case (since S is simple). Hence, it terminates at a Nash equilibrium. This is illustrated 
in Figure 2.1 for dimension 3. 
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Figure 2.1 The symmetric LH algorithm in dimension 3. Point a is completely labelled, being 
adjacent to facets with labels 1,2,3. Dropping label 1, it proceeds to point b picking 
up label 2, now duplicate. The next point is c with duplicate label 3, and finally d 
where the missing label 1 is picked up, which terminates the path. 
As in the simplex algorithm (Dantzig (1963)), edge traversal is implemented alge-
braically by pivoting with variables entering and leaving a basis, the nonbasic variables 
representing the current facets. The only difference is the rule for choosing the next enter-
ing variable, which in the simplex algorithm depends on the objective function. Here, the 
complementary pivoting rule chooses the nonbasic variable with duplicate label to enter 
the basis. 
In Figure 2.1, the starting point a has an orientation, with the labels 1, 2,3 in clock-
wise order. When label 1 is dropped, the remaining labels keep their orientation (in one 
dimension less) relative to the edges of the path. In Figure 2.1, label 2 is always to the 
left and label 3 always to the right of the edge. At the endpoint of the path, the missing 
label is picked up at the other end of the edge, so that the orientation of that vertex is 
opposite to that of the starting vertex of the path; in Figure 2.1, point d has labels 1, 2,3 in 
anticlockwise order. This generalizes to higher dimensions, where orientation is defined 
as the sign of a certain determinant. The endpoints of any LH path have opposite orien-
tation, which leads to an index theory of equilibria (see Shapley (1974) and Garcia and 
Zangwill (1981)). Knowing the orientation of the artificial equilibrium, the orientation of 
any k-almost complementary edge can be determined directly. 
For nonsymmetric bimatrix games (A,B), or even for finding nonsymmetric equilibria 
of symmetric games as in the game of "chicken" above, the LH algorithm is applied as 
follows, which is its standard form. Let 
z (x 	 0 A) 
.13-T 0) 
(2.3) 
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The polytope S of dimension d = 	n in (2.1) is then the product P x Q of the polytopes 
P = E 	x > 0, BTx < 11, 	Q = fy E Rn I Ay < 1, y > 01. 	(2.4) 
Any Nash equilibrium (x, y) of (A, B) is again given by zT (1 —Cz) = 0, which is equivalent 
to ir (1 —Ay) = 0 and ir (1 — = 0. These conditions state that x is a best response 
to y and vice versa, where x and y have to be normalized to represent mixed strategies. 
The only difference to Lemma 2.2 is that this normalization has to be done separately for 
x and y, rather than for the entire vector z. It is easy to see that in equilibrium x = 0 if and 
only if y = 0, and then (0, 0) is the artificial equilibrium. 
The LH algorithm is applied as before, where a label corresponds either to a strategy i 
of player 1 or a strategy j of player 2. These have to be distinct, so it is convenient to 
number the n. strategies of player 2 as m + 1, , m + n, as suggested by Shapley (1974). A 
label then represents a pure strategy that has probability zero or is a best response. A label 
i with 1 < i < in is a strategy of player 1 and determines the facet xi = 0 of P or (Ay)1 = 1 
of Q, corresponding to the respective ith inequality in (2.4) that becomes binding. A label 
j with m + 1 < j < m+ n is a strategy of player 2 and determines the facet (BTx)j = 1 of 
P or yi = 0 of Q, which is the respective jth binding inequality in (2.4). 
The LH path using the edges of S = P x Q is a subgraph of the product graph of the 
edge graphs of P and Q. This means that edges are alternately traversed in P and Q, 
keeping the vertex in the other polytope fixed. A duplicate label picked up in P is dropped 
in Q and vice versa. This is the standard view of the LH algorithm; for further details see 
von Stengel (2002). 
We end this section with two similar, simple, but useful lemmas concerning the LH 
algorithm, which, as far as we know, have not appeared explicitly in the literature thus 
far, although they are implicit in the work of McLennan and Tourky (2005). Assume that 
P and Q are simple, which is true if the game is nondegenerate. Then, any vertex of P is 
defined by exactly m facets, and so has m labels. Likewise, any vertex of Q has n labels. 
Lenuna 2.3 Every LH path on P x Q induces a simple path in each polytope P and Q, 
that is, no vertex of P or Q is ever left and visited again on an LH path. 
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that a vertex x of P is left and visited again on an LH path. 
This means that there are three vertex pairs (x, y), (x, y'), and (x, y") with y 	y" on the 
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LH path on P x Q, and all three are k-almost-complementary, for some k in { 1, . . . , m -Fn} . 
The m labels of x define n — 1 labels that y, y', and y" must share. However, this is 
impossible, since the n — 1 labels correspond to n — 1 equations in n-space that define a 
line, which can only contain two vertices. The situation for Q is analogous. ❑ 
Lemma 2.4 Let (x,y) be a completely labelled vertex pair of P x Q. If (x,y') is part of 
an LH path on P x Q, either y' = y or (x,y) and (x, y') are connected by an edge on that 
LH path (i.e. y' and y connected by an edge in Q). 
Lemma 2.4 states that if a vertex x of P is part of some complementary vertex pair, 
then, for any LH path, it only appears as the endpoint of the induced path in P. The 
analogous statement is true for a vertex y of Q that is part of a complementary vertex pair. 
Proof: Since (x,y') is part of an LH path, it is a k-almost-complementary vertex pair, for 
some k in {1, , m nl. This means that x and y' have at least m n — 1 distinct labels. 
Either they have all m +n labels and y' = y, or y' shares exactly one label with x, and then 
this is a duplicate label. Dropping this label in Q leads to the vertex y, along the edge 
connecting y' and y. ❑ 
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Chapter 3 
Hard-to-Solve Bimatrix Games 
In this chapter, we construct hard-to-solve bimatrix games using the theory of polytopes. 
The study of bimatrix games via the best response polytopes can be traced back to the al-
gorithm of Vorob' ev (1958) for finding all Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game (via a vari-
ant of Lemma 2.2), and Kuhn (1961), who simplified this algorithm. Important progress 
was made with the development of the algorithms by Lemke and Howson (1964) and 
Lemke (1965), which are major topics of this thesis. Shapley (1974) introduced facet la-
bels, and described Nash equilibria of bimatrix games as completely labelled vertex pairs 
of the best response polytopes, which is crucial to our exposition throughout. Since then, 
there has been much relevant research into the theory of polytopes, LCPs, and computa-
tional complexity. 
For constructing bimatrix games with certain properties, polytopes with a known com-
binatorial structure are useful. In a d x d game where each player's payoff matrix is the 
identity matrix, there are 2" — 1 many equilibria, which are all symmetric, correspond-
ing to the non-empty subsets of {1, , d} . Both the best response polytopes are cubes, 
and in each polytope every vertex is part of a complementary vertex pair, with one ver-
tex, the origin, corresponding to the artificial equilibrium. We explain the case d = 3 in 
full detail in Section 3.1. Quint and Shubik (1997) conjectured that these games achieve 
the maximal number of equilibria for any d x d square game, and proved it for d < 3. 
Keiding (1997), and independently McLennan and Park (1999), showed that it is true for 
d = 4, but the conjecture was refuted by von Stengel (1999), who constructed d x d games 
with more than 2" many equilibria for d > 6, by labelling pairs of dual cyclic polytopes; 
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the case d = 5 is open. In this context, dual cyclic polytopes have two attractive fea-
tures: their combinatorial structure is known in arbitrary dimension (Gale (1963)); for a 
polytope with a fixed number of facets they have the most number of vertices possible, 
according to the upper bound theorem of McMullen (1970). In this chapter, we use not 
only dual cyclic polytopes, but also simplotopes, which are the product of simplices, thus 
generalizing cubes. 
In Section 3.1, we give an introduction to constructing games with labelled polytope 
pairs. In Section 3.2, we describe the well-understood dual cyclic polytopes. In Sec-
tion 3.3, we construct the double cyclic polytope games F(m,n), by labelling a pair of 
dual cyclic polytopes. In Section 3.4, we show that for the square games F(d, d) the LH 
algorithm takes exponentially many steps for any dropped label. In Section 3.5, we show 
that, as well as producing long LH computations, the games F(d, 2d) also take on average 
exponential time to solve by support enumeration. This requires that the columns of the 
game F(d, 2d) are randomly permuted. We explain the square case F(d, d) first, since 
the LH paths of the games F(d, 2d) are easily described in terms of those of F(d, d). In 
Section 3.6, we describe how to "unscramble" the random permutation and quickly find 
an equilibrium of F(d, 2d), if the rest of the construction is known. In Section 3.7, we 
explain how to interpret the "Lemke paths" of Morris (1994) as paths of the symmetric 
LH algorithm described in Section 2.2. All ordinary LH paths for these symmetric games 
are very short, and lead to nonsymmetric pure-strategy equilibria. We then explain the use 
of imitation games in this context, as suggested by McLennan and Tourky (2005), giving 
another class of square games with exponentially long LH paths. Extending this, in Sec-
tion 3.8, we present triple imitation games T(d), which are 3d x d games that (like the 
games r(d, 2d)) are hard to solve by both support enumeration and the LH algorithm. In 
fact, a pair of labelled dual cyclic polytopes may not have any completely labelled vertex 
pairs at all, and in Section 3.9 we give an example of a class of such labelled dual cyclic 
polytope pairs. 
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3.1 Constructing bimatrix games with polytopes 
We construct games by defining P and Q in (2.4). These polytopes have a special form, 
where the first m inequalities in P and the second n inequalities in Q are nonnegativities. 
This is not restrictive, since it is only the combinatorial structure of the polytopes that 
matters. The first building block for constructing an m x n bimatrix game is a pair of 
polytopes P' and Q' of known combinatorial structure, with appropriate dimensions and 
number of facets; Pi is in dimension m with m n facets, and Q' is in dimension n with 
n facets. The m+ n facets of each of the polytope pairs are labelled with 1, , m+ n, 
which correspond to the pure strategies of the game. If the labellings gives rise to at least 
one completely labelled vertex pair, then the polytopes can be brought into the special 
form (2.4). The special form is achieved via an affine transformation, described in Propo-
sition 3.1, which is the final step in the construction. A completely labelled vertex pair is 
chosen, and mapped by the affine transformation to the origin (the artificial equilibrium of 
the LH algorithm), as described in Proposition 3.1. Then, all the other completely labelled 
vertex pairs correspond to Nash equilibria. 
Thus, we are only interested in the combinatorial structure of the polytopes, as en-
coded by their vertex sets. Throughout this chapter, we represent vertices as bitstrings. 
For a simple polytope in dimension d with f facets, each vertex is represented by a bit-
string of length f with exactly d bits that are 1, where the ith bit, which corresponds to 
the ith facet, is 1 if and only if the vertex lies on the ith facet. 
The labellings of the polytopes determine the order in which the facet-defining in-
equalites appear in the game matrices. This is illustrated in Proposition 3.1 and the follow-
ing simple example. The example uses cubes and is thus also helpful for understanding 
the construction of triple imitation games in Section 3.8, which uses simplotopes, a gen-
eralization of cubes. For simplicity, we start with polytopes that already have the special 
form of (2.4). After the example, we explain the affine transformation required to contruct 
game matrices using general polytopes. We construct 3 x 3 games in which the polytopes 
P and Q are both combinatorial 3-cubes. Since m = n = 3, we have f = 3 + 3 = 6. To 
represent the vertices of the 3-cubes as bitstrings, we need an order of the facets that will 
correspond to the order of the positions in the bitsrings. By the symmetry of cubes, we 
need only know which facets are "opposite" each other. Suppose that the facet cone- 
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sponding to position i in the bitstring is opposite the facet corresponding to position i+ 3 
for i = 1,2,3. Thus, for any bitstring u representing a vertex of the 3-cube, we have 
bli = 1 < 	> 	= 0 for i = 1,2,3. 	 (3.1) 
So a bitstring u represents a vertex of the 3-cube if and only if 
u E {111000,011100,101010,110001,100011,010101,001110,000111}. 
It is easy to directly write down inequalities defining a cube in dimension d, where 
d of the 2d facets are nonnegativities namely, 0 < xi < 1, for i = 1, 2,3. Thus, we do 
not need to use an affine transformation to construct the game matrices, and P' = P and 
= Q. The artificial equilibrium is (0,0), and so the first three inequalities in P are 
x> 0, which have labels 1,2,3, respectively, and the last three inequalities in Q are y > 0, 
which have labels 4,5,6, respecitvely. Now we label the remaining facets of P and Q. 
Without loss of generality, we label inequality xi < 1 of P with label i +3 for i = 1,2,3. 
We consider three different labellings for Q. 
(a) First, suppose that P and Q are labelled identically. Then every vertex of P is part of 
a completely labelled vertex pair, with the vertex in Q being the complement of the 
vertex in P'. For example, (u, v) = (011100,100011) is one of the eight completely 
labelled vertex pairs, with u having labels {2,3,4} and v having labels {1,5,6}. The 
corresponding game has seven Nash equilibria, and the best response polytopes are 
P={xE1183 1x> 0, /x<1}, 	Q={yEIR3 1/y< 1, y> 0}, 
where I as the identity matrix in 113 x 3 . The corresponding game is shown in Fig-
ure 3.2. 
(b) We now change the labelling fo Q' so that the corresponding game has a unique 
completely mixed equilibrium. The labelling of Q' is a permutation relative to the 
labelling of P'. The permutation keeps labels 4,5,6 fixed, and maps label 1 to 3, 2 
to 1, and 3 to 2. It is easy to check that the only completely labelled vertex pairs are 
(u,v) = (111000,000111) and (u,v) = (000111,111000), so the game has a unique 
completely mixed equilbrium, where each player plays all his strategies with positive 
probability. 
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P Q 
0 	 (Dtop facet 
(c) We consider one more labelling of Q. Again, facets 4, 5,6 get labels 4,5,6 respec-
tively. Facet 1 gets label 1, facet 2 gets label 3 and facet 3 gets label 2. It is easy to 
check that the set of completely labelled vertex pairs is 
{ (111000, 000111), (000111, 111000), (100011, 011100), (011100, 100011)} . 
The polytopes P and Q with labels are illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 A pair of labelled 3-cubes with four completely labelled vertex pairs, which are high-
lighted. The labellings correspond to example (c). If the labels 3 and 2 were swapped 
in polytope in Q, every vertex is part of a completely labelled vertex pair, and the cor-
responding game has seven Nash equilibria (example (a)). If the labels 1 and 3 are 
swapped in Q, there are two compltely labelled vertex pairs and the corresponding 
game has a unique Nash equilirium (example (b)). 
How do the different labelling affect the game matrices. Since we only change the 
labels of Q, only the payoff matrix A changes. The ith row of A corresponds to label 
i. Thus, the inequality (Ay)i should be that inequality that has label i. In each case the 
payoff matrix B is just the identity matrix, and the payoff matrices for player 1 are identity 
matrices with the rows permuted. The examples (a) and (b) easily generalize to arbitrary 
dimension, to give d x d games with 2" — 1 and 1 equilibrium, respectively. Notice that 
however we label a pair of d-cubes with 2d facets, the corresponding game will always 
have a completely mixed equilibrium. 
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Figure 3.2 Game (a), which corresponds to two identically labelled 3-cubes, has seven Nash 
equilibira. Game (b) has a unique completely mixed equilibrium. Game (c) has 
three equilibria. In each game, BT = I, and the matrix A is an identity matrix with 
permuted rows. 
For a pair of labelled polytopes that do not have the special form of (2.4), the la-
belling of the polytopes determines the order of the facet-defining equalities in P' and 
Q'. To get the payoff matrices A and B, we apply the affine transformation described in 
Proposition 3.1. 
Proposition 3.1 (von Stengel (1999)) Let 13' be a simple m-polytope and Q' be a simple 
n-polytope, both with m+ n labelled facets, which have at least one complementary pair 
x ,y') of vertices. Then there are m x n matrices A and B defining P and Q in (2.4), a 
permutation of the labels 1, . ,m n of P' and Q' yielding the labels of P and Q, and 
invertible affine transformations from P' to P and from Q' to Q that map (x' ,y i ) to (0,0). 
Furthermore, every complementary vertex pair of (P' ,V) except (x' ,y') represents a Nash 
equilibrium of the bimatrix game (A,B). 
Proof: Permute the labels 1, ... ,m+n in the same way for P' and Q' such that x' has labels 
1, , m and y' has labels m 1 , . . . , m n. This does not change the complementary pairs 
of (P', V). Let 
1;1' = {z ERm 	< p, Dz q} 
where Cz < p represents the m inequalities for the facets 1, , in and Dz < q the remaining 
n inequalities. For the vertex , we have Cx' = p and Dx' < q since PI is simple. The m 
binding inequalities for xi are linearly independent since x' is a vertex, so C is invertible 
and z i x = —Cz + p is an affine transformation with inverse z = —C -1 (x — p). Let 
P = {x ERin —C-1 (X — p) E P'}. Then, with r = q — DC-1 p, 
P={xEIVI—x<0, —DC—lx<r}. 
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Corresponding points of P and P' have the same labels. Since the vertex 0 of P cor-
responds to x' in P', 0 < r. Thus, the jth row of —DC-1x < r can be normalized by 
multiplication with the scalar 1/ri, so we can assume r = 1. Then P is defined as in (2.4) 
with the n x m transposed payoff matrix BT = —DC-1 . Similarly, we can find an in x n 
matrix A so that Q in (2.4) is an affine transform of Q'. The complementary vertex pairs 
of (P', Q') except (2,y1 ) correspond to the Nash equilibria of (A,B) by construction. ❑ 
The effect of the affine transformation on the size of the numbers in the description of 
P' and Q' is polynomial. Thus, if the data required to specify P' and Q' is polynomial in 
n (true for all the polytopes we consider), so will be the data for the game matrices A 
and B. 
In Section 3.9, we show that it is possible to label a pair of polytopes, with each 
poltopes in dimension d with 2d facets, such that there are no completely labelled vertex 
pairs. Thus, not every pair of polytopes with the correct numbers of facets can be labelled 
arbitrarily to produce a game. 
In the next section, we introduce dual cyclic polytopes, which we use in the construc-
tion of games with exponentially long LH paths. 
3.2 Dual cyclic polytopes 
We construct games by defining P and Q in (2.4) as the well-understood "dual cyclic poly-
topes" (see Ziegler (1995) or Griinbaum (2003)), similar to von Stengel (1999). These 
polytopes are in dimension d and have f facets, where d = m for P and d = n for Q, and 
in both cases f = m-Fn. 
A standard way of obtaining a cyclic polytope ID' in dimension d with f vertices is 
to take the convex hull of f points p(t1) on the moment curve p: t (t,t 2 ,...,td ) T for 
1 < i < f. However, the polytopes in (2.4) are defined by inequalities and not as convex 
hulls of points. In the dual of a polytope, its vertices are re-interpreted as normal vectors 
of facets. The polytope P i is first translated so that it has the origin 0 in its interior, for 
example by subtracting the arithmetic mean Ti of the points ,u(ti) from each such point. 
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The resulting vectors ci = p(ti) —Ti then define the dual cyclic polytope 
Pll={zERdIcTz<1,1<i<f }. (3.2) 
Both P and Q in (2.4) will be dual cyclic polytopes with a special order of their inequalities 
corresponding to the facet labels. A suitable affine transformation, described in Proposi-
tion 3.1, gives P from P", and Q in a similar manner, so that the first m inequalities (for 
the pure strategies of player 1) in P have the form x > 0, and the last n inequalities (for 
the pure strategies of player 2) in Q are y > 0. The last n inequalities B-rx < 1 in P and 
the first m inequalities Ay < 1 in Q then determine the game (A,B). The game data is of 
polynomial size in m n, since the coefficients ci in (3.2) are clearly polynomial, and the 
affine transformation giving P from P", and simlilarly Q, preserves polynomiality. So, 
the running time of an algorithm with the game as input is polynomial if and only if it is 
polynomial in m n. 
A vertex u of a dual cyclic polytope in dimension d with f facets is characterized 
by the bitstring uiu2- uf of length f, with the kth bit uk indicating whether u is on the 
kth facet (uk = 1) or not (uk = 0). The polytope is simple, so exactly d bits are 1, the 
other f — d bits are 0. Assume that t1 < t2 < < tf• when defining the kth facet of 
P" by the binding inequality (p(tk) — p)z < 1. Then the vertices of P" are characterized 
by the bitstrings fulfilling the Gale evenness condition, due to Gale (1963): A bitstring 
represents a vertex if and only if any substring of the form 01 • • • 10 has even length, so 
0110, 011110, etc., is allowed, but not 010, 01110, and so on. A maximal substring of l's 
is called a run. Except for in Section 3.9, we only consider even dimensions d, where the 
allowed odd runs of 1's at both ends of the string can be glued together to form an even 
run, which shows the cyclic symmetry of the Gale evenness condition. Let G(d, f) be the 
set of these bitstrings of length f with d ones fulfilling Gale evenness. 
3.3 The double cyclic polytope games F (n1 , n) 
For the rest of this chapter, both m and n are even, and m < n. The vertices of P and 
Q are described by the sets of bitstrings G(m, m n) and G(n, m + n), respectively. The 
1's in a bitstring encode the facets that the vertex belongs to. We need facet labels for 
the complementarity condition and the LH algorithm. The facet labels are defined by 
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permutations 1 and 1' of 1, ... , m + n for P and Q, respectively. For a vertex u of P, which 
we identify with its bitstring in G(m, m + n), its labels are given by 1(k) where uk = 1. 
The kth facet of P (corresponding to the kth position in a bitstring) has label 1(k) = k, 
so 1 is simply the identity permutation. A vertex v of Q is identified with a bitstring in 
G(n,m+ n), and its labels are 1 1 (k) where vk = 1, for 1 < k < m+ n. The kth facet of 
Q has label /1 (k). The permutation 1' has the fixed points / / (1) = 1 and 1' (m) = in, and 
otherwise exchanges adjacent numbers, as follows: 
1 1 (k). 
k, 	k=1,m, 
k+ (-1) k , 2 < k < m-1, 
k— (-1) k , m+1<k<171+17. 
(3.3) 
   
Let F(m, n) be a game defined in this way. 
The artificial equilibrium eo of F(m, n) is a vertex pair (u, v) so that u is labelled 
with 1, ,m and v with m + 1, ... , m + n, so that we have complementarity. In terms of 
bitstrings, u = 1'0" (which are m ones followed by n zeros) and v = Om 1", which both 
fulfill Gale evenness, and have the indicated labels under 1 and 1', respectively, so that 
eo = (1 m0", Om 1") E G(m,m+n) x G(n,m+ n). 	 (3.4) 
The following lemma states that in any Nash equilibrium of F(m, n), player 1's strat-
egy has full support. 
Lemma 3.2 Consider a Nash equilibrium of F(m, n), represented by a pair of bitstrings 
(u, v) in G(m, m + n) x G(n, m + n). Then u = Oms and v = lint for some bitstrings s and t 
of length n. 
Proof: The vertex pair (u,v) is completely labelled, and it is not the artificial equilib-
rium eo. Either um = 1 or vm = 1. We begin with the latter case, so u m = 0. If vm+ I = 1, 
then um+2 = 0 (via complementarity, since r (in -I- 1) = m+ 2) so um+ i = 0 by Gale even-
ness, and thus Vm+2 = 1. Continuing in that way, all 1's to the right of the mth bit vm 
of v (which is 1) have to come in pairs. Similarly, if v m_i = 1 (implied by vni+ i = 0, 
v,n = 1 and Gale evenness), then Um_2 = 0 by complementarity, which with um = 0 im-
plies u,n_i = 0, and vni_2 = 1. This means that the 1's to the left of vn1  come in pairs if 
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there is a zero to the left of them. But then the run of l's containing v,„ has odd length 
and must include v,„+„, and then it is too long. Hence, there is no zero in v to the left of 
vm , and v = lint and u = On's for some bitstrings s and t of length n, as claimed. 
In the same way, um = 1 implies that all bits in u to the left of um are 1, and, since u 
has only m bits equal to one, all bits to right of um are zero, so that (u, v) = eo, which is 
the artificial equilibrium and not a Nash equilibrium. ❑ 
Corollary 3.3 The only Nash equilibrium of the game r(d,d) is el = (odidi ldod). 
Proof: For m = n = d, the vertices u and v in Lemma 3.2 are bitstrings containing d 1's, 
so that s = ld and t = Od . 	 ❑ 
3.4 The square games F(d, d) and long Lemke—Howson 
paths 
In this section, we only consider square games where d = m = n. Then, by Corollary 3.3, 
all LH paths, for any missing label, lead from eo to ei . We analyze these paths for square 
games. It will then be easy to describe the LH paths for the non-square games F(d,2d), 
which are treated in Section 3.5. 
Denote by n(d,k) the LH path with missing label k for the game F(d,d). We regard 
n(d,k) as a sequence (u° , v°) (u 1 , v 1 ) • • • (uL , vL) of vertex pairs in P x Q, that is, in 
G(d) x G(d), where G(d) abbreviates G(d, 2d). Let L(d,k) = L be the length of that 
path. 
As an example, Figure 3.3 shows 7t(4, 1). The numbers at the top are the labels 1(k) 
and / 1 (k) for k = 1, , 8. The vertices of P and Q are shown as bit patterns, where for 
better visual distinction of the bits a zero bit is written as a dot. The 20 steps of this path 
are indicated at the side, where the odd-numbered steps change the vertex in P, and the 
even-numbered steps the vertex in Q. Step i changes the vertex pair (u" , v") to (u i , vi). 
The starting point e0 is the vertex pair eo = (u°, v°) = (11110000, 00001111). Step 1 is to 
drop label 1 in P from u0 , so the bit u? changes from 1 to 0. By Gale evenness, this gives 
the bitstring 01111000 as the new vertex u 1 in P. In Figure 3.3, the bit 1 that is changed 
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Figure 3.3 The path n(4,1), with vertices of P and Q as bitstrings. A dot represents a zero bit. 
to 0 has a little downward arrow "v" underneath it, with the new bit that changes from 0 
to 1 indicated with that arrow above the new bit 1 in the next vertex. In u 1 , label 5 has 
been picked up, which is now duplicate and dropped from vertex v 1 in Q (where v 1 = 
giving the next vertex v2 = 00011011 in step 2. In P, the vertex u2 is unchanged, u2 = u 1 . 
The new duplicate label is 4. Hence, in step 3, label 4 is dropped in P, giving vertex 
u3 = 01101100. In that manner, the path proceeds until it ends at (u 20 , v20) el. 
We will show that all paths can be expressed in terms of the two special paths 7t(d, 1) 
and 7t(d, 2d). These have certain symmetries. Figure 3.3 illustrates the symmetry of 
It(d, 1), which is stated in the next lemma, for d = 4. 
Lemma 3.4 Let L = L(d,l) and let (14 1 ,11) be the ith vertex pair of the path 7c(d,1). Then 
for 0 < i < L, (tt i ,v i) = 
Proof: The particular names of the labels do not matter, so we can re-name them for both 
P and Q with the permutation in (3.3), the kth facet in P getting label // (/(k)), which is 
1 / (k), and in Q label / / (// (k)), which is 1(k). But then P and Q switch roles, eo is exchanged 
with el, label 1 stays the same, and the path backwards corresponds to n(d, 1) itself, as 
claimed. ❑ 
The symmetry of the path 7t(d,2d) is less easy to state. Figure 3.4 shows this path 
for d = 6. In that picture, disregard the last vertex in P, and the first and last vertex in Q. 
Then the column labelled 12 in both P and Q has only zeros since 12 is the missing label. 
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Figure 3.4 The path n(6,12). 
When this column in both P and Q is also disregarded, the bit pattern of the path shows 
a symmetry in each polytope by "pointwise reflection", where the point of reflection is 
in column 6 in step 18 of P, and at the vertex that stays fixed in Q during that step. The 
pointwise symmetry means that in each polytope, writing each bitstring backwards, while 
ignoring the bit corresponding to the missing label, gives the path in reverse direction 
(disregarding the first and the last two vertex pairs). For general d, this symmetry is 
stated in the next lemma. 
Lemma 3.5 Let L = L(d,2d) and let (u` ,v`) be the ith vertex pair of the path n(d,2d) 
for 0 < i < L. Let B(d) be the sub path (u l ,v 1 )- • (uL-2 ,vt-2 ) of 7t(d,2d). Then for the 
vertex pairs of B(d), for 1 < i < L —2, 
i 	 (3.5) uk = U
L
2d
-
-
1i 	(1 < k < 2d —1), 
i 	L-1-1 _ 1 	 (3.6) v i = 11- 2d 	— 1 
j (2 < k < 2d —2), 	 (3.7) v k = VL-1-i 2d-k 
u2d = V2d-1 = 0. 	 (3.8) 
In (u 1 , v 1 ), the duplicate label is 1, which is then dropped in P, and never picked up again. 
4 ( 
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Before we prove Lemma 3.5 we state several auxiliary definitions and lemmas that are 
used in subsequent proofs. 
Suppose that the bitstrings x= 	.x2d and y = Y1Y2 ...Y2d are two vertices of G(d). 
Then they are connected by an edge if and only if they differ only by a substring of the 
form 1P0 in x and 01P in y or vice versa, for some even p > 2. That is, there are two 
positions i and j so that 
{xixi+ i .x j, yiyi±i .y = f1P0, O1P}. 
(If j < i, this uses the cyclic symmetry of the Gale evenness bitstrings, taking 2d + 1 as 1, 
like in step 1 in Q in Figure 3.4.) We say that the edge crosses the positions i+1, , j —1. 
For example, the vertices x and y of P joined by step 3 in Figure 3.3 are 01111000 and 
01101100, where i = 4, j = 6, x4x5x6 = 110, y4y5y6 = 011 and the remaining positions 
of x and y are the same. This edge crosses only position 5. Recall that edges of LH paths 
are edges of the product polytope P x Q, joining (u, v) to , v) or (u, v) to (u, v'). We say 
that such an edge crosses a position k if this holds for the respective edge joining u to u' 
in P or v to vi in Q. 
To emphasize the dimension d, we write 
eg (id od ,od 	edi = (od , od ) 
Lemma 3.6 No edge of n(d,l) crosses position 1 or 2d. 
Proof: The first edge of n(d , 1) joins eg to (01d0d-1, °did\ ) and does not cross position 1 
or 2d. The same holds for the last edge joining (Od ld , Ol d0" ) to el. In any other edge, 
the bit in position 1 is zero in both polytopes, so the edge cannot cross position 1, nor the 
cyclically adjacent position 2d. 
The next lemma concerns the first and last vertex pair of the sub-path B(d) of n(d, 2d) 
defined in Lemma 3.5. 
Lemma 3.7 Let L = L(d, 2d) and let (u i ,v i ) be the ith vertex pair of the path 7t(d ,2d) for 
0 < i < L = L(d,2d). Then 
	
( il l , v1) = ( 1dod , iod-11d-201) , 	 (3.9) 
(uL-2 ,vL-2) = (0d-1 ido , 	 (3.10) 
36 
Proof. See Figure 3.4 for an illustration of the case d = 6. After step 1 of n(d, 2d), the 
vertex pair (u l , v 1 ) as in (3.9) is reached. The last vertex pair of n(d, 2d) is (uL ,v9 = 4. 
This is reached in step L-1 by picking up label 2d in P. Hence, the previous vertex pair is 
(uL-1 , vL-1 ) = (0d-1 id 0 , id 0d), where label d is duplicate. The vertex pair (uL-2 , vL-2 ) 
is therefore as in (3.10). ❑ 
The next lemma states conditions similar to (3.5) and (3.7) in Lemma 3.5, except that 
they concern labels rather than positions of bits. For the polytope Q, these conditions 
therefore do not describe the point-symmetry visible in Figure 3.4. 
Lemma 3.8 Let L = L(d, 2d) and let (u i ,vi) be the ith vertex pair of the path 1t(d,2d) 
for 0 < i < L. Let r be the permutation of {1,...,2d} defined by r(k) = 2d - k for 1 < 
k < 2d -1 and r(2d) = 2d. Then for 2 < i < L - 2, step i of n(d, 2d) corresponds to 
step L - i as follows: If label k is duplicate in the vertex pair (u i-1 ,vi-1 ), and hence 
dropped in step i to get (u 1 ,v1 ), then label r(k) is duplicate in (u1.-i ,vL-i ), and hence 
picked up when reaching that vertex pair from (uL-1- i ,v1.-1-i ) in step L- i. Furthermore, 
for 1 < i < L- 2, 
,L-1—i r(k) 
vL-1—i 
vlF (k) = 	(r(k)) 
(1 < k <2d), 
(1 < k <2d). 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
Proof: The proof will be by induction on i. The permutation r serves as a relabelling to 
state (and prove) the symmetry of the path. It writes the labels 1, , 2d - 1 backwards, 
and keeps the missing label 2d fixed. For a vertex u of P, labels and positions are the same. 
Then r, seen as a reversal of the bitstrings and cyclic shift by one position, preserves the 
Gale evenness condition. The induction is therefore easy for P. Equations (3.9) and (3.10) 
clearly imply (3.11) for i = 1. 
For a vertex v of Q, equation (3.12) has to be read as follows: the bit of vertex v i in 
position r (k), which has label k (because 1' is its own inverse), is equal to the bit of vertex 
VL-1—i in position (r(k)), which has label r(k). 
The set {2, 3, ... , 2d - 2} is mapped to itself under both r and 1'. Both bijections map 
d to itself, and it is easy to see that 
(r(k)) = r(l i (k)) 	(2 < k < 2d -2). 	 (3.13) 
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Consequently, for the more restrictive case 2 < k < 2d — 2, equation (3.12) is equivalent 
to 
= 111V)) 
	(2 <k< 2d-2, 1 <i<L-2). 	(3.14) 
Equation (3.14) implies that r can be applied to the positions of the bitstring v belonging 
to the set {r(2), , l' (2d 2)}, which is equal to {2, , 2d — 2}. If r could be applied 
to all positions of v, then r would be directly "compatible" with both the labels and the 
adjacency of vertices in Q. However, for k E {1, 2d — 1, 2d}, equation (3.13) does not 
hold, which complicates our proof. We have 
r (1) = 1, 11 (r(1)) = 2d, r(11 (1)) = 2d— 1, 
// (2d —1) = 2d, (r(2d — 1)) = 1, r(l i (2d — 1)) = 2d, 
P(2d) = 2d —1, 	(r(2d)) = 2d —1, 	r(11 (2d)) = 1, 
(3.15) 
As Figure 3.4 shows, the positions 1, 2d — 1, and 2d — 2 in Q are constant. Indeed, we 
will show 
vi = 1, 	14,1_ 1 = 0, 	vi d = 1 	(1 < i < L— 2). 	(3.16) 
The left two columns of (3.15) then show (3.12) also for k = 1,2d — 1,2d. Instead of 
(3.12), we prove by induction on i the stronger assertions (3.16) and (3.14). By (3.9) and 
(3.10), they are true for i = 1. 
The length L of n(d ,2d) is even since the path starts in Q and ends in P. Hence, if i is 
odd or even, so is L — i. 
As inductive hypothesis, suppose that (3.11), (3.16), (3.14), and therefore (3.12), hold 
for i — 1 instead of i. By the above considerations, this implies that if k is the duplicate 
label of (u1-1 , vi-1 ), to be dropped in step i, then r(k) is the duplicate label of (uL-1 , vL—i ), 
to be picked up in step L — i. 
Suppose first that i is even. Then step i from (ui-1 , vi-1 ) to (ui, vi) is in P, that is, the 
duplicate label is dropped in u i-1 to give the new vertex u i , and vi-1 = vi . Thus, (3.16) 
and (3.14) hold trivially for i. Because r preserves Gale evenness, the edge connecting 
ui-1 to ui in P corresponds to the edge connecting uL—i to UL-1-i as described. Hence, 
(3.11) holds for i, which completes the induction step for even i. 
Secondly, let i be odd, where step i is in Q. Let k be the duplicate label of (ui -1 , 
In step i, label k is dropped in vi-1 to give the new vertex vi, and ui-1 = u i . Hence, (3.11) 
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holds trivially for i. If k = 1, then because (3.16) holds for i— 1 by inductive hypothesis, 
changing vi—(k1 ) 	 P to zero would give vi (2d) = 1 and thereby terminate the path, which is not P  
possible. Hence, k 1. Similarly, if k = 2d — 1, then since (3.12) holds by inductive 
hypothesis, label r(k) is duplicate in (uL—i,vL—i ), where r(k) = 1 and so label 2d would 
be picked up in (uL -1— i, when going along the edge in Q from VL—i to vL-1—i . So 
k 2d — 1, which shows the induction step for (3.16). 
The duplicate label k therefore fulfills 2 < k < 2d — 2 (since obviously k 2d), and 
so does the label that is picked up, where the positions 1, 2d — 1, and 2d are not crossed 
because of (3.16). By inductive hypothesis, (3.14) holds for i — 1, and r preserves the 
adjacency of positions. Hence, step i in Q corresponds to the backwards step L— i in Q as 
claimed, which shows that equation (3.14) also holds for i. This completes the induction. 
Proof of Lemma 3.5: The preceding proof also shows Lemma 3.5. Lemma 3.8 specifies 
the statement to be proved by induction, and concerns the labels. We also used the fact 
that the permutation r preserves the adjacency of positions, as stated in the equations of 
Lemma 3.5. We have shown these since (3.5) is equivalent to (3.11), equation (3.6) fol-
lows from (3.16), equation (3.7) is equivalent to (3.14), and (3.8) holds trivially. Label 1 
is never again picked up in P since it is present in Q from step 1 onwards, by (3.16). ❑ 
The sub-path B(d) of 7t(d,2d) defined in Lemma 3.5, and the path Ir(d, 1), which we 
call A(d), are "building blocks" for other such paths in higher dimension, by inserting 
constant bits in suitable positions. This is stated in the following central theorem. Two 
paths it and lc' are concatenated by the following special path composition, which we 
denote by It ± n'. Hereby, both it and 7t/ are paths on P x Q = G(d) x G(d). Let (u, v) be 
the last vertex pair of it and let (u' ,V) be the first vertex pair of 7t/ . Then it n' is defined 
if (u, v) and (u', v') are joined by an edge in P x Q, that is, either u = it' and v is joined to 
V by an edge of Q, or v = v' and u is joined to u' by an edge of P. The length of the new 
path 7C ± 7tf is the sum of the lengths of it and n' plus one; the number of its vertex pairs is 
simply the respective sum. 
Theorem 3.9 Let A(d) = 7t(d ,1) and let B(d) be as in Lemma 3.5. Then there are paths 
C(d) and mappings a, [3,13', 7, 7 1 defined on vertex pairs, and extended to sequences of 
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vertex pairs, so that 
A(d) = 13(B(d))± C(d), (3.17) 
C(d) = cc(A (d — 2)) +13' (B(d)), (3.18) 
B(d) = 7(A(d — 2))+7' (C(d —2)). (3.19) 
We illustrate equation (3.17) for d = 6 using Figure 3.5, which shows the path A(6). 
Comparing Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5, we see that steps 1 to 33 of A(6) look almost like 
steps 2 to 34 of n(6, 12), which are the 33 steps of B(6). The only difference is that 
in B(6), the bit in Q in column 1 is one and the bit in the column with label 12 is zero, 
whereas in A(6) it is the other way around. The replacement of these two bits is performed 
by the mapping (3, defined in (3.20). The path C(d) in (3.17) is simply a tail segment of 
A(d). In Figure 3.5, C(6) consists of steps 35 to 88 of A(6). Step 34 of A(6) is the edge 
in Q joining the paths 13(B(6)) and C(6), represented by the "+" sign in (3.17) as defined 
before Theorem 3.9. 
To illustrate equation (3.18), note that C(6), beginning with step 35 of A(6), starts like 
n(4,1) shown in Figure 3.3, which is A(4). The bitstrings in A(4) are written backwards 
and extended by inserting a zero bit at the front and adding the bits 110 at the end of the 
bitstring in each polytope. This is done by the mapping a, which is defined in (3.21) , as 
are the other mappings in (3.18) and (3.19). 
Proof of Theorem 3.9: Overview: The mappings are given as follows: 13 and 13' are defined 
on G(d) x G(d), where 
= (u,0v2v3 .• •v2d_21v2d)- 
	 (3.20) 
The mapping 13' applies to a final segment of the the path A (d), which is symmetric as 
stated in Lemma 3.4. Hence, 13' is determined by 13, which applies to an initial segment 
of A(d) (see (3.23) below). The other mappings are a,7,7' : G(d — 2) x G(d — 2) 
G(d) x G(d). With it defined as the bitstring u reversed, 
a(u, = (Oit110,6110). 	 (3.21) 
With c = 2d — 4, 
7( 11 1. • • tic, v) = 	1 lug 	ttc00,10v01). 	 (3.22) 
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The mapping 7' in (3.19) applies to a final segment of B(d), which, as we will show, starts 
after the midpoint of B(d). Thus, 7' is determined by y due to the symmetry of B(d) stated 
in Lemma 3.5. 
First we show the following equation, which is equivalent to (3.17) and (3.18): 
A(d) = 13(B(d))+ cc(A(d —2)) +PB(d)). 	 (3.23) 
Note that only positions 1 and 2d — 1 in Q (corresponding to the missing label in A(d) 
and B(d), respectively) are changed by the mapping p, and these positions are constant 
throughout B(d) by (3.6) and (3.8). The starting point (u l , v 1 ) of B(d) is given by (3.9), 
and in the first step of B(d) label 1 is dropped in P. The path A(d) is also started by 
dropping label 1 in P from eg. Now (3(u 1 , v 1 ) = 4, as required, and in the first step of 
A(d) and B(d) the label to be dropped is 1 in P. As (u 1 , v 1 ) and 4 differ only in positions 
that are constant throughout B(d), the path B(d) maps to I3(B(d)) and thereby represents 
the initial part of A(d). For d = 6, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show how steps 2 to 34 of 7t(6,12) 
map to steps 1 to 33 of A(6) in this way. By (3.10), the endpoint of I3(B(d)) is 
p(0d—lid0 , id-10d = (0d-100 , 01d-20d-1 11 ) . 	(3.24) 
The duplicate label is 2d — 1, which has been picked up in P. So in the next step of A (d) 
(which is step 34 in Figure 3.5), label 2d —1 is dropped in Q and label 2d — 3 is picked 
up, giving the vertex pair 
(u* ,v*) = (0d-100 , 01d-20d-211 4 	 (3.25) 
(For the path 7c(d, 2d), label d would be picked up instead at this stage, as in step 35 in 
Figure 3.4.) This is the edge of A (d) which joins J3(B(d)) to a(A(d-2)) in (3.23). 
We are now at the start of C(d) and want to show that this path segment starts with 
a(A(d — 2)) with a in (3.21). Indeed, the starting vertex pair of C(d) is (u*, v*) = a(eg-2). 
The duplicate label is 2d — 3, which is to be dropped in P in the next step (step 35 in 
Figure 3.5). The subsequent steps are represented by a(A(d — 2)), since in the lower-
dimensional polytope, label 1 is dropped, which is mapped by a to label 2d — 3 of the 
higher-dimensional polytope; here, we consider a also as an injective map of labels, ob-
tained in the obvious way from (3.21), namely a(k) = 2d — 2 — k for 1 < k < 2d — 4. 
Essentially, the subsequent steps in A(d — 2) map into higher dimension by (3.21) and by 
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Lemma 3.6; we only need to check complementarity of the constant positions in higher di-
mension. In the higher dimension, position 1 with the missing label 1 is zero in both poly-
topes, consistent with (3.21). Positions 2d — 1 and 2d are also complementary by (3.21). 
For positions 2d — 3 and 2d — 2, we have complementarity because 2d — 3 is zero, since 
it is obtained from the position with the missing label 1 in lower dimension. This shows 
that the initial segment of C(d) is indeed a(A(d — 2)). 
In the last step of A (d — 2), label 1 is picked up in Q (this is step 20 in Figure 3.3). So in 
the last step of a(A(d — 2)), label 2d — 2 is picked up in Q (this is step 54 in Figure 3.5). 
Then we are at the vertex pair (v*, tt*) = ot(edi —2 ), which is (01 d-20d-2 1 1 0 , od— 1 1 d 0 ) 
by (3.25). We have shown that the initial part of A (d) in (3.23) is 13(B(d)) a(A(d — 2)) 
and that the starting point and endpoint of oc(A(d — 2)) are (u* , v*) and (v*, u*), respec-
tively. Then the rest of the path A(d) in (3.23) is obtained by Lemma 3.4: The next vertex 
pair, obtained from (v*, u*) by dropping label 2d — 2 in P (step 55 in Figure 3.5), is 
v1) = (0 id-20d— 1 	od-1 do) 	 (3.26) 
which agrees with Lemma 3.4 and its symmetric counterpart in (3.24) (in Figure 3.5, 
step 34 backwards). Thus, the remainder is the path f3(B(d)) backwards but with the 
bitstrings for P and Q exchanged. Using the symmetry of B(d) in Lemma 3.5, this part 
of the path can be expressed as 13/ (B(d)) with a suitably defined mapping fY, similar to p, 
which exchanges the bitstrings for P and Q. This shows (3.23). 
We now show (3.19). The first part of B(d) is indeed 7(A (d — 2)): Both B(d) and 
A (d — 2) start by dropping label 1 in P, and the starting point of B(d) is 'y(e(01-2 ). Then 
B(d) proceeds like y(A(d — 2)) because of Lemma 3.6 and since complementarity holds 
for the constant positions in higher dimension, which is easily checked using (3.22). Next, 
by (3.23), 
y(A(d — 2)) = y[I3(B(d — 2)) a(A (d — 4)) ± (B(d — 2))]. 	(3.27) 
Now consider the starting point (till , v") of 13/ (B(d — 2)), which is (u1 ,11) given by (3.26) 
but with d —2 instead of d. (For d = 6, (u", v") is the start of step 14 of A(4) in Figure 3.3.) 
Furthermore, consider the endpoint of 13/ (B(d — 2)), that is, the endpoint el-2 of A (d — 2). 
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The images of these points under 'y are 
7(un , v") = 7(01 d-40d-3 11, 0d-3 1 d-20) = (01d-2-d-3 0 	1100,10d-2 1 d-2001) 
7(6,1-2 ) = 7(0d-2 1 d-2 ,1 d-20d-2 = (0110d-3 1 d-200,101 d-20d-1 1) 
(For d = 6, these two points are, respectively, the beginning of step 15 and the end of 
step 21 of 746,12) in Figure 3.4, corresponding to steps 14 and 20 of B(6).) These two 
vertex pairs y(ull ,v") and 7(4-2 ) are point-symmetric images of each other under the 
symmetry of B(d) described in Lemma 3.5. This means that the endpoint 7(e1 -2) of 
7(A(d - 2)) is already in the second half of B(d). The central part of B(d) (steps 15 to 21 
in Figure 3.4), given by the last part of 7(A(d - 2)) in (3.27), is 7[r3'(B(d - 2))]. Therefore, 
there is a mapping 7' so that 
	
B(d)=T[f3(B(d - 2)) + a(A(d - 4)) + 13'(B(d - 2))] +7'[a(A(d - 4)) 	(B(d - 2))], 
because the paths A(d - 4) and B(d - 2) are symmetric and therefore do not have to be 
written backwards. This representation of B(d) is equivalent to (3.19), as claimed. 	El 
Let an be the number of vertex pairs of A(2n), which is one more than the length 
L(2n,1) of that path. Let bn and cn be the number of vertex pairs of B(2n) and C(2n), 
respectively. That is, 
an = L(2n,l) +1, 	bn = L(2n,4n)- 2 	(n> 1). 	(3.28) 
Then the concatenation of paths in (3.17) implies an = bn cn , in (3.18) cn = an-i +bn, 
and in (3.19) bn = an-i+ cn_i. Moreover, the paths 7t(2,1) and 7t(2, 4) have length 4 = 
al -1 = b1+ 2. This shows that the numbers bi,c1,ai ,b2,c2,a2,... are the Fibonacci 
numbers 2,3,5, 8,13,21, ... given by 
fo = 1 , 	= 2, 	fn+i = fn + fn-1 	(n? 1), 	(3.29) 
that is, 
an = hrz, 	bn = f3n-2 	1). 	 (3.30) 
So both the lengths of n(d, 1) and of n(d,2d) for even d = 2n = 2,4, 6, ... are given 
by every third Fibonacci number (minus one and plus two, respectively). These are the 
longest paths. They occur several times, since, as shown next, L(d, I) = L(d, d) and 
L(d,d + 1) = L(d,d +2) = L(d, 2d - 1) = L(d, 2d). This is due to the symmetry of the 
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Figure 3.5 The path A(6) =n(6,1). 
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Gale evenness condition and of the labellings. Other paths x(d,k) are given as concatena-
tions of these paths in lower dimension. They are characterized, for all possible missing 
labels k, in the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.10 The LH path lengths for any missing label are characterized by (3.28), 
(3.29), (3.30), and 
(a) L(d, k) = L(d, d +1 — k) and L(d, d + = L(d, 2d 	k), for 1 < k < d; 
(D) L(d, k) = L(d ,k+ 1) for even k when 2 < k < d — 2, and odd k when d +1 < k < 2d —1; 
(c) L(d, = L(k, 1) +L(d — k, l) for even k and 2 < k < d — 2; 
(d) L(d,d + k) = L(k,2k)+L(d — k+ 2, 2(d — k+ 2)) — 4 = 	+ bd12 -1c/2-4-1 when k is 
even and 2 < k < d — 2. 
The proof of this theorem is similar to the proofs of Lemma 3.5 and Theorem 3.9. 
Examples of paths where Theorem 3.10 applies can be found in Appendix A.2. Using 
(b), cases (c) and (d) cover all possible missing labels. Before we prove Theorem 3.10, 
we prove two lemmas. 
For any paths A and B on G(d) x G(d), considered as sequences of vertex pairs, let 
AB denote the path A joined to the path B, where the endpoint of A is equal to the starting 
point of B. The length (number of edges) of AB is the sum of the lengths of A and B. The 
next lemma uses this concatenation of paths. 
Lemma 3.11 Let k be even and 2 < k < d — 2. Then 
n(d,k) = a(A(k))13(21(d — k)) 
with a : G(k) x G(k) G(d) x G(d) = P x Q, 
a(u,v) = (lik • • • 1411"0"U2k• • • Uk+1,Vk • • •V1 011—k i d—kV2 k " • Vk+1) 
and : G(d — x G(d — k) G(d) x G(d), 
13(u, v) = (Okul k , l kv0k). 
Furthermore, no edge of the path n(d,k) crosses position 2d — k or 2d — k +1. 
(3.31) 
(3.32) 
(3.33) 
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Proof: The starting point of n(d,k) is 4. As required, a(e16) = 4. In the first step of 
7c(d,k), label k is dropped in P. Position 1 of the lower dimensional polytopes, given by 
the bits to and vl in (3.32), is mapped by a to position k in both P and Q in the higher 
dimension. In P, position k has label k, which is missing in n(d, k). This missing label 
in the higher dimensional polytope P corresponds to the missing label 1 in the lower 
dimension. The last position 2k in the lower dimension, with bits u2k and v2k, is mapped 
to position 2d — k+ 1 in the higher dimension. By Lemma 3.6, no edge of the path A (k) 
crosses the positions 1 and 2k in the lower dimension, so inserting the substrings 1"0" 
or 0"1" between these bits, as done in (3.32), gives edges in P and Q, respectively. 
Furthermore, no edge of a(A(k)) crosses position 2d — k or position 2d — k +1. 
The mapping a preserves the cyclic adjacency of labels. The first L(k, 1) steps of 
n(d, k) are given by a(A(k)) if the positions k+ 1 up to 2d — k of the higher dimensional 
polytopes are complementary. Complementarity of positions k + 2, ... , 2d — k is imme-
diate. Positions k and k+ 1 in P and Q, respectively, correspond to the missing label k 
of n(d,k) and are thus both zero throughout. Finally, the bit in position k +1 in P, with 
label k +1, is 1 according to (3.32). That bit is complementary to the bit in position k 
in Q, which has label k + 1, since this bit corresponds to the missing label in the lower 
dimensional polytope and is therefore zero throughout. 
After L(k, 1) many steps, the vertex pair a(el) is reached, where 
a(4) (ok i d—kod—k i k , i kod—k id—kok) p(eg—k) . 
This is also the starting point of 13(A(d — k)), as required. In a similar way as before, one 
can see that this is the second part of n(d,k), which ends in p(4-1c) = 4. Lemma 3.6 
for the lower-dimensional polytope and equation (3.33) imply that no edge of 13(A (d — k)) 
crosses position 2d — k or 2d — k +1. ❑ 
Lemma 3.12 Let k be even and 2 < k < d. Then 
n(d ,d + = eg +7(B(k)) 8(13(d k + 2)) +4, 	(3.34) 
where y: G(k) x G(k) G(d) x G(d) = P x Q, 
70,1,V) = (411 d-4 142 ' • • U2k0d- k 	od -kv2 	V2kid-k), 
	 (3.35) 
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and 8: G(d — k+ 2) x G(d — k+ 2) G(d) x G(d) = P x Q, 
8(u, v) (vd_k+2 " V2d-2k+2 v 	v V2 — • V d —k+1 
lid—k+2 • • • U2d-2k+211c-2U2d_2k+30" It - • • 
	
1 	Ud—k+1)• 
No edge of n(d, d +k) crosses position d +k or d + k+ 1 in P. 
Proof: According to (3.34), n(d,d + k) is the concatenation of two paths in dimensions k 
and d — k+ 2. These do not sum to d, unlike in (3.31). This works because in the vertex 
pair 8(u, v), the vertex in P is obtained from v by ignoring the bits v1, V2d_2k+3, which are 
constant throughout B(d — k+ 2) by Lemma 3.5, and adding 2k — 1 constant bits, and the 
vertex in Q is obtained from u by ignoring the bit u2d_2k+4  and adding 2k — 3 constant 
bits. 
It can be verified that both 7 and 8 preserve the adjacency of the labels used by the LH 
path, and complementarity. The path it(d, d + k) starts as follows: In step 1, label d + k is 
dropped from 4 in Q. The new vertex pair is (1d0d,10d-11k-20id —k-1- 1 ) which is equal 
to 7(u l , v 1 ) for the first vertex pair (u 1 , v 1 ) of B(k), as in (3.9) (with k instead of n). Then 
the path continues as described in (3.35) because, by Lemma 3.5, it first drops label 1 
in P, and never picks it up again, and because the bits vl and v2k in (3.35) stay constant 
according to (3.6). The last vertex pair of 7(B(k)) is, by (3.10) and (3.35), equal to 
,y(ok- I i ko, u i) = (OldOk-2 ikod-k+ 1 , 10" 0-20kid-k+1). 
This is equal to 8( 1 d-k+20d-k+2 ,iod—k+lid—k01), which is 8 applied to the first vertex 
pair of B(d —k+ 2), using (3.9) with d — k+ 2 instead of d. The duplicate label is d + k — 1, 
and is to be dropped in Q. The corresponding bit is in position d —k in Q, and is the image 
of the bit ui under 6. As stated at the end of Lemma 3.5, this bit /LI is indeed changed to 
zero in the first step of B(d — k— 2). The last vertex pair of 8(B(.d — k+ 2)) is 
(0d—k+ 1 d—k+2o , d—k+ 10d—k+2 1 ) (0d-1 	 dod) 
with duplicate label d. This label has just been picked up in Q, and the corresponding bit 
in position d is the image of bit 142d —2k+3 under 8. When label d is then dropped in P, the 
endpoint 4 is reached, which terminates the path Tc(d,d + k). This completes the proof 
of (3.34). 0 
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Proof of Theorem 3.10: For (a), let Ni  be defined by llf (k) = d — k+ 1 and Ni(d + k) = 
2d — k+ 1 for k = 1,.. . , d. This is a cyclic shift by d followed by a reversal of positions, 
which leaves the set G(d) invariant, and maps 4 to itself. Furthermore, Ni  commutes 
with the labellings 1 and l' of P and Q. Consequently, when the positions of the bitstrings 
representing the vertex pairs on the path 7t(d,k) are permuted by yr , one obtains the path 
n(d, d — k+ 1), which has therefore the same length as n(d,k). 
To show (b), let 2 < k < d — 2. As in Lemma 3.4, the relabelling 1' in (3.3) applied to 
both P and Q shows that n(d,k) corresponds to the path Tc(d,k+ 1) backwards, so these 
paths have the same length. 
Claim (c) follows from (3.31) in Lemma 3.11. 
According to (3.34) in Lemma 3.12, the length of n(d, d + k) is the sum of the lengths 
of B(k) and of B(d— k+ 2) plus two (for the first edge from 4 and last edge to el), which 
shows (d). El 
It is easy to see that the shortest path lengths are obtained as follows: If d is divisible 
by four, that is, d/2 is even, then the shortest path length occurs for missing label d/2, and 
is given by L(d,d/2) = 2ad/4 — 2 according to Theorem 3.10(c). If d/2 is odd, then the 
shortest path length occurs for missing label 3d/2, where L(d, 3d/2) = L(d, 3d/2 + 1) = 
2bd/241 /2 by Theorem 3.10(b) and (d). When d/2 is even, the path when dropping label 
3d/2 is only two steps longer than when dropping label d/2 since then L(d, 3d/2) = 
bd42+bd14+1= bdi4+ ad 14+ cd/4 = 2ad 14. Therefore, the shortest path results essentially 
when dropping label 3d/2. 
The Fibonacci numbers (3.29) have the well-known explicit expression (see, for ex-
ample, Graham, Knuth, and Patashnik (1994)) 
fn = 	+KO n , 	= 0.5 + 0.5A/3, 	K,K = 0.5 ± 0.3 \73, 
where 4) = 1.618... is the Golden Ratio and K = 1.170.... Then fn is KV' rounded to the 
nearest integer since 17- (Tn is less than 0.5 and at any rate exponentially small. By Theo-
rem 3.10(d), the sequence of shortest LH path lengths L(2n,3n) for n= d/2 = 1,2,3, ... 
is 4,10, 16,42, 68,178, ... , which is the sequence of Fibonacci numbers (multiplied by 
two) with every third number omitted. These shortest lengths grow with the square root 
of the longest lengths, which is still exponential. 
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Corollary 3.13 There are d x d games, for even d, where the length of each LH path is 
at least proportional to 03(1/4 . 
A construction using a similar labelling to (3.3) is possible for odd d, but there the path 
lengths are less symmetric than those in Theorem 3.10 for even d. We do not need this 
since it is trivial to obtain an odd-dimensional game from the next lower even dimension 
by adding a strictly dominated strategy for each player. 
Not all almost complementary vertex pairs are part of the LH paths we have analysed 
so far. The almost complementary edges can form cycles, rather than being part of an LH 
path that leads to an equilibrium. We end the section with Figure 3.6, an example of an 
explicit cycle for dimension 6 and missing label 1. 
1 3 2 5 4 6 8 7 10 9 1211 step 
• 31 1 	 , 1 IL 1 1 \ 
• • 	1 1 • • • •• 	IL 1 1 1 
• 11 • • • 	i )\ 46 
• • 11 	 • •• •• 11 • 11 
• 1 It 	 v 1 i 1 1 8 
Figure 3.6 A cycle of almost complementary edges in dimension 6 with missing label 1. 
3.5 Non-square games F(d, 2d) and support enumeration 
So far, we have analyzed the d x d games F(d,d). They have a unique equilibrium which 
is found by the LH algorithm after an exponential number of steps, for any missing label. 
However, the equilibrium is completely mixed, and is easily found by support enumera-
tion (e.g., Dickhaut and Kaplan (1991), Porter, Nudelman, and Shoham (2004), or Barany, 
Vempala, and Vetta (2005)). This simple algorithm tests the possible supports of equal 
size for both players, and checks if equating the expected payoffs to the other player in 
his support defines mixed strategies that are best responses to each other. There is only 
one pair of supports where both players use d strategies, so this is tested quickly. 
In this section, we consider the d x 2d games F(d, 2d). By Lemma 3.2, in any Nash 
equilibrium of such a game, both players use mixed strategies with support size d. The 
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following lemma states that for player 2, the supports of equilibrium strategies form only 
an exponentially small fraction of the possible ( 2‘di) supports of size d. The notation 
S(d12) is chosen to be consistent with von Stengel (1999). 
Lemma 3.14 Let S(d12) be the set of bitstrings of length 2d containing d ones of the 
form sis2...sk where each substring si is either 00, 11, or 0110. Then (u, v) is a Nash 
equilibrium of the game r(d, 2d) if and only i f u = O ds and v = l dt for s, t E S(d /2), where 
s = sis2...sk and t = tit2...tk, and ti is 11, 00, or 0110 if and only if si is 00, 11, or 0110, 
respectively, for 1 < i < k. Asymptotically, 
S(d 12)1 0.81 2.414d 	( 2d ) 0.56— 4d . 	(3.36) 
	
VT/ 	d 
Proof: It is easy to see that the described bitstrings define Nash equilibria. The claims 
follow from von Stengel (1999): As in Proposition 3.2 of that paper, one can see that these 
are the only equilibria. An exact expression for the size of S(d/2) is (3.6) on p. 564, and 
p. 566 gives an asymptotic formula, denoted by a'(d/2) (for convenience, these formulas, 
and a table with the corresponding values for small d are given in Section A.3), with 
rounded parameters as in (3.36). The expression for ( 2dd) is based on Stirling's formula. 
The following theorem shows that the LH paths for F(d, 2d) are exponentially long, 
since they are closely related to the paths of the square game F(d,d), which have length 
L(d,k) when dropping label k. 
Theorem 3.15 Let M(d, k) be the length of the LH path in the game r(d, 2d) when drop-
ping label k, for 1 < k < 3d. Then 
(a) M(d, k) = M(d, d + 1 — k) and M(d,d 	= M(d,3d +1 — k), for 1 < k < d; 
(b) M(d, = L(d, k) for even k and 2 < k < d; 
(c) M(d,d ±k) = L(d,d k) for even k and 1 < k < d; 
(d) M(d,2d +k) = L(d,l) +1 for even k and 1 < k < d. 
By condition (a) of this theorem, it suffices to consider only even labels k in conditions 
(b), (c), and (d), so these cover all possible missing labels k. 
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Proof of Theorem 3.15: Claim (a) is proved in the same way as Theorem 3.10(a), with the 
permutation Iv of {1, , 3d} defined by v(k) = d + 1- k for 1 < k < d and v(d + k) 
3d +1- k for 1 < k < 2d. 
For (b), (c), (d), let k be even and 2 < k < d. We consider the mappings e, 	: 
P x Q = G(d, 2d) x G(d, 2d) G(d, 3d) x G(2d, 3d) defined by 
E(U,V) = - - • U2d—kOd U2d—k+1' • • U2d ,v1 • • • V2d—kl d V2d—k+1* • • v24 (3.37) 
(u, v) = (ui•• • ud+kOd 	+k+1 ' " U2d,V1 ' • • vd-Fkl d 1 d -1-k+1 •••• • 112d) (3.38) 
v) = (u0d , 1 V2 • • • V2d ik-2vi id-k+1) (3.39) 
Let p(d,j) be the LH path for the game F(d, 2d) with missing label j, for any j = 
1, , 3d. We show that p(d,k) = e(7t(d, k)). Both paths start by dropping the same la-
bel k. If k < d, then by Lemma 3.11, no edge of the path ic(d, k) crosses position 2d -k or 
2k - k+ 1. This holds also when k = d, since by Theorem 3.10(a), n(d,d) corresponds to 
n(d, 1), and Lemma 3.6 implies that n(d ,d) does not cross positions d and d +1. There-
fore, it is possible to insert between positions 2d - k and 2k - k+ 1 the bitstring Od in P, 
and l d in Q, as in (3.37), which implies p(d,k) = e(n(d, k)), as claimed. This proves (b). 
Next, we show that p(d,d+k) = (7c(d,d +k)). By Lemma 3.12, no edge of n(d, d + 
k) crosses position d + k or d + k + 1 in P, so it is possible to insert the bitstring O d 
 between these positions, as done in (3.38). To obtain complementarity, ld is inserted 
between positions d + k and d + k + 1 in Q. These positions in Q are crossed by some 
edges of the path n(d,d+k), but because a contiguous string of l's is inserted, those steps 
of It(d,d + k) are mapped by to the respective steps of p(d,d + k) as well. This shows 
the claim, giving (c). 
Finally, we show p (d, 2d + k) „.= (1  d 02d , od +2d \ 1 ) ri(7c(d, 1)). Dropping label 2d + k, 
the first step of p(d, 2d +k) reaches the vertex pair (1`102d , 10d-1 d 1k-201d-k+1), which 
is equal to (eg). In this vertex pair, the duplicate label is 1, which is dropped in P 
in the next step 2 of p(d, 2d + k). Beginning with this step, p(d,2d + k) is equal to 
71 (7t(d,1)) (from step 1 onwards), for the following reasons: the vertex pairs are almost 
complementary; by Lemma 3.6, the bitstring Od can be inserted at the end of u in (3.39), 
and lk-2 can be inserted between v2d and vi ; finally, 1"+2 can be cyclically inserted 
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between positions v 1 and v2 , which does not affect the steps in the second polytope. This 
proves (d). 	 1=1 
In any Nash equilibrium of the game F(d, 2d), the strategy of player 1 has full support. 
The supports of equilibrium strategies of player 2 define the set S(d/2). By (3.36), these 
form an exponentially small fraction F, 
F= I S(ci / 2)1 P.-, 1.44 x 0.6d 	 (3.40) S(/
d/  
of all supports of size d for player 2 (the support of size d for player 1 is unique). This is 
the success probability F of a support enumeration algorithm that tests a single random 
support of size d. We show in Lemma 3.16 that a support enumeration algorithm that 
tests d-sized supports of player 2 uniformly at random (without replacement) has to test 
an exponential number of supports on average before finding an equilibrium. In this 
lemma, the set S(d/2) is called E. Let U be the set of all d-sized subsets of { 1, ... 
so io = (21). 
Lemma 3.16 Consider a d x 2d game where a pair of supports defines a Nash equilib-
rium if and only if both supports have size d, and player 2's support belongs to the set E, 
a set of d-sized subsets of { 1, ... ,2d}. A support enumeration algorithm that tests sup-
ports picked uniformly at random without replacement from the set of all d-sized subsets 
of { 1, . , 2d} has to test an expected number of 
CP-1E1 4_ 1 
 1E1+1 
supports before finding an equilibrium support. 
(3.41) 
Proof To find the expected number of guesses required to find an equilibrium we use 
a standard argument (Motwani and Raghavan (1995), p. 10). Assume some order of 
enumeration for the elements of U. The elements of U \ E, which we index by i, with 
1 < < (2:\ — ) 1E1, correspond to non-equilibrium supports. Let W1 be the indicator vari-
able that takes the value 1 if the ith element of U \E precedes all members of E in the 
enumeration of U, and 0 otherwise. Then W = W, is the random variable equal 
to the number of supports checked before the first equilibrium is found. Then, using the 
linearity of expectation, we have 
lui-1E1 	1u1-1E1 	1u1-1E1 	1 	
(c
i) _ 1E1 
EW = E( E wi), L E(WV) E 	 
=1 	i=i 	 1E1+1 	1E1+1 
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This shows that the expected number of support guesses until an equilibrium is found 
is given by (3.41), as claimed. 	 ❑ 
For E = S(d/2), the number in (3.41) is about 0.7 x 1.66d . Support enumeration 
therefore takes exponential time on average for a game F(d, 2d) 1 . 
Corollary 3.17 There are d x 2d games, for even d, where the length of each LH path is 
at least proportional to 4)3`114 N  1.43d, and where a support enumeration algorithm has to 
test on average about 0.7 x 1.66d many supports of size d before it finds an equilibrium. 
It is natural to ask if we can construct games that are "hard to solve" even if details of 
the construction are known. If an algorithm knows the set E, it could simply pick a mem-
ber of E. To avoid this, suppose we randomly permute the columns of the game with a 
uniformly chosen random permutation p. This is equivalent to permuting the positions of 
bitstrings in the set E with p, thus giving a new set of equilibrium supports E. For the LH 
algorithm, the permutation does not affect the possible path lengths. How effectively does 
this "hide" the equilibrium supports from a support enumeration algorithm that knows E? 
First, we consider a general set E (not necessarily S(d/2)). If a support enumeration 
algorithm knows the set E (but of course not E), it may be possible to do better than test 
a random sequence of a supports. That is, a random permutation of the strategies cannot 
completely "hide" the structure of E. For example, if E = {u E U ui = 11, so equilibrium 
supports are exactly those that use the first strategy, an element of E can be found in at 
most two guesses for anty d, by testing a bitstring x and then its complement 2. 
What about for the games F(d, 2d), where E = S(d/2)? In fact, in this case it is also 
possible to do better than testing a completely random order of supports, by exploiting the 
structure of E. We give an example for d = 2, so S(d/2) = S(1) = {1100, 0011, 0110}. 
Denote by p-1 the inverse of p. The following enumeration order is better than random: 
For the first guess, test any bitstring u in U. The second guess is derived from the first 
guess by swapping a single zero bit with a single one bit of u uniformly at random to give 
u' (there are four ways to do this). The third guess is derived from the first guess u by 
swapping a different 0/1 pair uniformaly at random to give u" (i.e., swapping one of the 
'When looking at all potential supports, rather than just those with full support for the player with d 
strategies, the number of guesses is obviously even larger, although Lemma 3.16 no longer applies. 
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remaining three 0/1 pairs). The fourth guess can be any support not tested so far, since 
this will be an equilibrium. 
If the first guess u is not an equilibrium, then p -1 (u) E {1010, 0101, 1001}. This 
occurs with probability 1/2. If p-1 (u) E {1010,0101}, then tif will be an equilibrium 
for three out of the four possible swaps of 0/1 pairs (only if p -1 (u') = 1001, is u' not an 
equilibrium). If p -1 (u) = 1001, then u' will be an equilibrium for two of the four possible 
swaps of 0/1 pairs (only if p-1 (d) E {1010,0101}, is u' not an equilibrium). Thus, using 
Baye's rule, if the first and second guess are unsuccesful, with probability 1/2 we have 
/3-1 (u') = 1001 (and the third guess is defnitely successful), and with probaility 1/2 we 
have p-1 (d) E {1010,0101} (and the third guess is successful with probability 2/3). This 
gives an expected number of guesses of 
1* (1/2)+ 
2*(1 — 1/2)(2/3*3/4+ 1/3*1/2)+ 
3*(1 - 1/2)(1 — (2/3*3/4+1/3*1/2))(1/2+1/2*2/3)+ 
4*(1-1/2)(1— 2/3)(1— (1/2+ 1/2*2/3)) 
=1*1/2+2*2/3+3*5/36+4*1/36 
25 =1 6 = 1.69444... 
Thus, this support enumeration scheme beats a completely random one, which gives a 
expected number of guesses of 1.75. It is open whether it is possible to devise a sequence 
of supports using E = S(d/2) that give a polynomial number of expected guesses before 
finding an element of E; it seems unlikely that this is possible. In any case, this question 
is somewhat artificial, since there is no reason to suppose that one would know the set E, 
but not the whole construction. Knowing the precise construction of r(d, 2d), with the 
complete structure of the polytopes, except for the random permutation of the columns, it 
is possible to find an equilibrium in d very special pivoting steps; we describe this method 
in Section 3.6. However, these steps are not in any way suitable for finding an equilibrium 
of a general bimatrix game. 
The games r(d, 2d) with randomly permuted columns seem to be "hard to solve" for 
any known general-purpose algorithm that finds a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. 
Enumerating the vertices of the polytopes P or Q in (2.4) is another way of finding an 
equilibrium (see von Stengel (2002) for a survey). A natural starting point for vertex enu- 
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meration is the vertex pair (0, 0) of P x Q. In both polytopes, any Nash equilibrium vertex 
is at least d edges away from that starting point by Lemma 3.2, and there are an exponen-
tial number of such vertices. Therefore, one should expect that finding an equilibrium by 
vertex enumeration takes long as well. Since there are many vertex enumeration methods, 
an analysis is not attempted here. So far, the games F(d, 2d) seem hard for any general 
algorithm that finds an equilibrium of a bimatrix game. 
3.6 Quickly finding an equilibrium of r(d, 2d) with per- 
muted columns 
In this section, we describe a specialized method that finds one Nash equilibrium of a 
game r(d, 2d) with randomly permuted columns in d pivoting steps; it is not a general 
method, and only works for these games. 
For a game F(d, 2d) (without randomly permuted columns) the equilibrium supports 
of player 2 are given by Lemma 3.14. In particular, following the notation of that lemma, 
one equilibrium is given by s = 1 d0d ,t =Od l d , that is, 
( u , v) 
= (od d od d od d ) 	 (3.42) 
which corresponds to player 2 playing her first d strategies (columns). Assume that a 
permutation 7t of { 1, , 2d} is used to permute the columns of a game r(d, 2d) = (A, B), 
to give new payoff matrices (A, T3). 
The best response polytopes of the game (Al, T3) are 
	
P = 	{x E Rd I x > 0, T3Tx < 1}, 
= 	{Y) E led Ay < 1, y> 0}, 
which are identical to the polytopes 
(3.43) 
(3.44) 
P 	= 	{x Ell 	I x > 0, BTx < 11, (3.45) 
Q 	{yE R2c/lAy< 1 ,), > 0} (3.46) 
except that the order of the inequalities B Tx < 1 of P and y > 0 of Q have been permuted 
by 7C to give T3Tx < 1 and .53 > 0. So, for i = 1... d, label i corresponds to inequality i in P. 
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For i = d +1...3d, label i corresponds to inequality n(i — d) + d. The method finds the 
equilibrium of (71,B) that corresponds to (3.42) using the Gale evenness condition, and 
by pivoting in P, the best response polytope of player 1. 
The origin is a vertex of P and is represented by the bitstring 1 d02d , where the first d 
inequalities in (3.43), which correspond to x > 0, are tight. We pivot away from the 
origin in P by dropping label 1 (the variable x1 enters the basis, and we leave the facet 
corresponding to x1 = 0). We reach a new vertex v i , picking up label 741) +d. Next, we 
drop label d from vi, thereby reaching the a new vertex v2, and picking up label 7c(2) +d. 
We perform d — 2 more pivoting steps. For i = 2, ... , d — 1, we drop label 7c(i — 1) + d 
(which was picked up in the previous step) from vi, thereby reaching the vertex vi+ i , and 
picking up label ic(i + 1) d. We can now stop, since we have found an equilibrium 
(we could continue pivoting in this manner to discover the complete permutation 7t). An 
equilibrium support of player 2 is given by the strategies corresponding to columns {7c(i) : 
i =1,...d}. We illustrate the case d = 4 in the Figure 3.7. 
What if the rows are permuted as well? We can still find an equilibrium quickly, now 
in at most 2d + 1 steps. The method first does between 2 and d 1 pivots in Q. These 
pivot steps reveal the two rows in A that the permutation has mapped from the rows 1 and 
d in A, although we cannot distinguish between them. The method then does d pivots in P, 
as above. However, since we cannot distinguish between 7t(1) and 7c(d), either we find the 
equilibrium corresponding to (3.42), as before, or we find the equilibrium corresponding 
to (u, v) , (02d id , 1 2dod) . 
3.7 Morris's construction, the games FM (d), and imita- 
tion games 
Morris (1994) considers "Lemke paths" on simple d-dimensional polytopes T with 2d 
facets. A vertex v of T is given, and the d facets incident to v have labels 1, , d. The 
remaining d facets have also labels 1, , d, so each label appears twice. A Lemke path 
starts at v by dropping a label k and traversing the unique edge leaving the facet with la-
bel k. The endpoint of that edge is a new facet which has either label k, which terminates 
the path, or a duplicate label, which is then dropped by leaving the other facet with that 
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{d, 	k =1, 
1(k) = k, 1 < k < d, 	1(d + k) = (3.47) 
d —k 	k even and 2 < k <d, 
d+2—k, 	k odd and 2 < k< d, 
1, 	k even and k= d. 
labels in P 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
labels in P 1 2 3 4 n(1)+d ir(2)4-d it(3)+d 71(4)-F d 7c(5)+d it(6)+d n(7) + d n(8) - F d 
O E P 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
v i 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
V2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
v3 0 1 1 o 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
V4 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
eq. support o 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Figure 3.7 Permuted labels of F(d, 2d) with d = 4. 
label. The path continues in that manner until another completely labelled vertex is found. 
Applied to the polytope S as in (2.1) with vertex v = 0, with facet labels 1, ,d for the 
inequalities z > 0, and 1, ,d for Cz < 1, we have called this the symmetric LH algo-
rithm. Any polytope T with vertex v can be affinely mapped to S with v mapped to 0. By 
Lemma 2.2, the completely labelled vertices (apart from 0) then correspond to the sym-
metric equilibria of the symmetric bimatrix game (C, CT ). However, this interpretation is 
not considered in Morris (1994). 
Morris constructs exponentially long Lemke paths by taking for T the dual cyclic 
polytope in dimension d with 2d facets, for both odd and even d, suitably labelled as 
follows. In Section 3.2, we have identified such a polytope with the set G(d, 2d) of Gale 
evenness bitstrings, which describe the vertices of T in terms of the facets they lie on. In 
the order of the bits in those bitstrings, the facets 1, , 2d are given the labels 
For d = 6, for example, the 12 facets, corresponding to the positions in a bitstring in 
G(6, 12), are labelled with 1,2,3,4,5,6,6,4,5,2,3,1. Denote the bimatrix games (C, CT ) 
obtained from Morris's examples by Fm(d). In analogy to Corollary 3.3, it is easy to see 
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that then the only completely labelled vertices of T are 1d0d (which is the starting point v 
of a Lemke path, our artificial equilibrium), and 0d 1d, which corresponds to a completely 
mixed symmetric equilibrium. 
However, these bimatrix games Fm (d) have a large number of nonsymmetric equi-
libria, in particular two pure strategy equilibria that are always found by the ordinary, 
nonsymmetric LH algorithm after two or three steps, for any missing label. For illustra-
tion, we consider the game FM(6). Since the bimatrix game (A,B) is (C, CT), the two 
polytopes P and Q in (2.4) are 
P {x E Rd I x > 0 , Cx < 1}, Q=:{yell8d 1Cy<1,y> 0}, 	(3.48) 
so they are the same polytopes as S in (2.1), except that the first d inequalities x > 0 
in P are labelled with 1, 2, ... , d, whereas these inequalities y > 0 in Q are labelled 
d +1,d + 2, ... , 2d. The inequalities in Cx < 1 in P correspond to the pure strategies 
of player 2. Since P is the dual cyclic polytope, this means that the 12 facets of P, as po-
sitions in a bitstring in G(6,12), have labels 1,2,3,4,5,6,12,10, 11, 8,9,7, corresponding 
to the interpretation of the second d labels in (3.47) as strategies of player 2. In other 
words, the labels 12,10,11, 8,9,7 mean that the second set of d inequalities defining the 
dual cyclic polytope appear, respectively, as rows 6,4,5,2,3,1 of C, just as in the sym-
metric game. In the same way, Q is the dual cyclic polytope, with its 12 facets labelled 
7,8,9,10,11,12,6,4,5,2,3,1. Figure 4 shows the LH path for this game with missing 
label 9. It terminates at the pure strategy equilibrium (d,d + 1) where player 1 plays his 
last strategy (which has label d) and player 2 plays her first strategy (which has label 
d +1). It is easily shown that in the game TM(d), every LH path terminates either at this 
equilibrium or its symmetric counterpart (1, 2d), if d is even. If d is odd, every LH path 
of rm(d) leads to either (2,2d) or (d,d + 2). For any d, every LH path is only two or 
three steps long. 
P 
step 1 2 3 4 5 6 12 10 11 8 9 7 
Q 
7 8 9 10 11 12 6 4 5 2 3 1 step 
	
111111 	 
2( 11111 v  1  
1 1 1.111. v 	 
41 • 11111 
• 111111 
) 
) 3 
Figure 3.8 An LH path for the symmetric bimatrix game Fm (6). 
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The symmetric equilibria of a symmetric game (C, CT) correspond to the arbitrary 
equilibria of another, closely related game. This is the imitation game (C,I) (introduced 
in McLennan and Tourky (2005)), which is a square game where the payoff matrix to 
player 2 is the identity matrix I. 
Proposition 3.18 (McLennan and Tourky (2005)) The mixed strategy pair (y, y) is a Nash 
equilibrium of the symmetric game (C, CT ) if and only if there is some strategy x so that 
(x,y) is a Nash equilibrium of the imitation game (C,I). 
After our construction of the games r(d, d), described in Savani and von Stengel 
(2004; 2006), McLennan and Tourky (2005) made the ingenious observation that the LH 
paths for imitation games (C, I), projected to the polytope Q of player 2, give the paths of 
the symmetric LH algorithm. 
Proposition 3.19 (McLennan and Tourky (2005)) Let (C, CT ) be a nondegenerate d x d 
symmetric game (C, CT ). The steps of the symmetric LH algorithm applied to this game 
with missing label k, for 1 < k < d, correspond exactly to the even-numbered steps of the 
LH path for the imitation game (C, I) with missing label k, and to the odd-numbered steps 
of the LH path for (C, I) with missing label d -F k. 
Proof: For the imitation game (C,I), the polytope Q in (2.4) is equal to the polytope 
S in (2.1). However, the d inequalities y > 0 in Q have labels d 1, ,2d rather than 
1, , d in S. The polytope P is the d-cube E Rd x > 0, x < 1}. Hence, any edge of 
P drops some label i and picks up label d i, or vice versa, for some i E 11, , d}. Any 
step of the symmetric LH algorithm is an edge of S, and thereby represents an edge of Q. 
It is easy to see that it corresponds to an even- or odd-numbered step of the LH path for 
(C,I), as claimed. ❑ 
Consequently, also noted by McLennan and Tourky (2005), the games (C, CT ) =- 
Fm (d) give rise to exponentially long LH paths for the imitation games (C,I). It fol-
lows from the results by Morris (1994) that the longest such path has length proportional 
to (1 + li)d/2 ,•- -.11.55d , and the shortest path length proportional to (1 + Nh.)d/4 1.25d . 
For our square games F(d,d), these numbers are 0 3d/2 ti 2.06d and, by Corollary 3.13, 
03d/4 1.43d , respectively. (For imitation games, the polytope P is the d-cube, so no LH 
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path can have more than 2d steps.) Thus, the games F(d, d) have longer LH paths. More 
significantly, however, they can be extended to the non-square games F(d, 2d) described 
in the previous section, which are also hard to solve by support enumeration. In contrast, 
the imitation games (C, /) for FM(d), which are necessarily square, are easy to solve by 
support enumeration. However, based on the ideas of Morris's construction and imitation 
games, in the next section we construct triple imitation games that are hard for both the 
LH algorithm and support enumeration. 
3.8 The triple imitation games T(d) 
The second class of hard-to-solve bimatrix games we construct are 3d x d games, where 
only Q is a dual cyclic polytope, this time in dimension d with 4d facets. Like for the 
double cyclic polytope games, the facets of Q have labels given by a suitable permutation 
of the order of the facets used in a combinatorial description of the vertices of such a 
polytope, the Gale evenness condition. We call these games triple imitation games since 
the payoff matrix of player 2 has the form of three identity matrices stacked on top of each 
other. (If it was a square game with a single identity matrix, it would be an imitation game 
(see Section 3.7 and McLennan and Tourky (2005)). The resulting polytope P is a product 
of d tetrahedra. As a product of simplices, it is also called a simplotope, a generalization 
of a cube. 
As for the double cyclic polytope games, all equilibria of the triple imitation games 
are such that the player with the smaller number d of pure strategies uses all of them with 
positive probability, so the equilibria have full support for that player. In an equilibrium, 
both players have equal sized support, so only a d-sized subset of the 3d strategies of 
the other player can be that player's equilibrium support. The games have an exponen-
tial number of equilibria, but they form an exponentially small fraction of all possible 
supports, even when restricted to the supports of size d for each player. Consequently, 
a random guess of such a support takes exponential expected time. We characterize in 
Section 3.8 below the sets of supports that define an equilibrium. By permuting player 
1 's 3d strategies randomly, any sequence of support guesses is no better than random. 
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(Lemma 3.16 could have been stated more generally; it also applies to this case of hiding 
d-sized supports among 3d strategies, with an obvious change to the proof.) 
A 3d x d triple imitation game T(d) is defined as follows. The polytope Q is a dual 
cyclic polytope with 4d facets in dimension d. The polytope P is given by 
P 	x Eled x> 0, xi -Fxd+i x2d+i < 1 for 1 <i<d}. 	(3.49) 
According to (2.4), this means that the payoff matrix B used in the inequalities BTx < 1 
is given by BT = [Id/d Id] with Id as the d x d identity matrix. 
The 4d inequalities of P are labelled as in (3.49). The inequalities of Q are those of 
P" in (3.2) for f = 4d, labelled by the following labelling function 1". Again, 1" is its 
own inverse, so the l"(k)th inequality of P" is the kth inequality of Q. The first, second, 
third, and fourth set of d inequalities get labels pk , qk, rk , and sk, respectively, where for 
1 < k < d, 
1" (k) = pk = k, 
1" (d +0= qk = 2d +1—k, 
1" (2d + = rk = 2d + k, 
1"(3d+k) sk= 
4d 
4d+1— k— (-1) k , 
3d +1, 
(3.50) 
k= 1, 
2 < k < d —1, 
k -= d. 
An example for d = 6 of 1" is given in the proof of Lemma 3.20 below. Morris (1994) 
used a dual cyclic polytope in dimension d with 2d facets, where for 1 < k < d, facets k 
and sk — 2d both have label k. In our construction, the role of facet k can here be taken by 
pk or rk. In this section, we show that each LH path in a triple imitation game corresponds 
to one of the "Lemke paths" of Morris (1994). 
Similar to Lemma 3.2, the next lemma states that all Nash equilibria in T(d) have full 
support for the player with fewer pure strategies. These games have also an exponential 
number of equilibria. 
Lemma 3.20 The 3d x d triple imitation game T(d) has 3d/2 Nash equilibria, and in 
each equilibrium player 2 uses all d strategies with positive probability. 
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Proof. According to (3.49), the polytope P is a product of d tetrahedra. Hence, in any 
vertex x of P, for each k=1,... , d, exactly three of the four inequalities xk > 0, Xd+k> 0, 
X2d+k> 0, and xk +Xd+k-FX2d-Fk < 1 are binding, and the other holds as a strict inequality. 
Since there are four choices for each k for the non-binding inequality, P has 4d vertices. 
In order to get an equilibrium (x,y), the non-binding inequality for x in P determines a 
facet of Q that the vertex y must lie on, that is, a 1 in the bitstring v in G(d, 4d) that 
represents y. Because 1" in (3.50) is its own inverse, the complementary vertex pairs of 
P x Q are therefore given by those v in G(d, 4d) where for 1 < k < d, 
(v(pk),v(qk),v(rk),v(sk)) E {(1,0,0,0),(0,1,0,0),(0,0,1,0),(0,0,0,1)1, 	(3.51) 
that is, exactly one of the four bits v(pk), v(qk), v(rk), v(sk) is 1, and the others are 0, where 
v(i) is the ith bit of v, for 1 < i < 4d. To see this, suppose, for example, that v(qk) = 1. 
Then the vertex is on the qkth facet of Q, which has label I ll (qk) = 1" (d d 1 — k) = 
2d +1 — (d +1 — k) = d k. So this label d k is present in Q, and by complementarity, 
absent in P, so the (d k)th inequality for x in P is non-binding, that is, xd+k > 0. By 
the combinatorial structure of P, therefore xk = X2d-l-k = 0 and xk + Xd+k = 1. 
These binding inequalities of P have labels k, 2d k, and 3d k, which are the labels 
of the pkth, rkth, and skth facet of Q, respectively. By complementarity, this implies 
v(Pk) = v(rk) = v(sk) = 0. 
Suppose that v(sd) = 1. We use (3.51) to show that this gives the artificial equilibrium. 
Namely, then v(pd) = v(qd) = v(rd) = 0, and since position rd --= 3d of the bitstring is next 
to sd = 3d+ 1, this requires that v(3d ± 2) = v(sd_2) = 1 by Gale evenness. By (3.51), 
v(pd_2) = v(qd-2) = v(rd_2) = 0. This is shown for d = 6 in Figure 3.9. 
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1"(i) 
(*) 
v(i) 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
0 
5 
5 
6 
6 
0 
12 
6 
0 
11 
5 
10 
4 
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9 
3 
8 
2 
7 
1 
13 
1 
14 
2 
15 
3 
16 
4 
0 
17 
5 
18 
6 
0 
24 
6 
1 
22 
4 
1 
23 
5 
20 
2 
21 
3 
19 
1 
Figure 3.9 Labels of Q for T(d) with d = 6 
Here, the entries of row (*) show k where / 11 (i) E fpk,qk,rk,skl. Because of the "gap" 
between each of v(pd) and v(pd_2) etc., Gale evenness implies v(pd_1) = v(qd_i) 
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v(rd_i) = 0. Thus, v(sd_i) = v(3d + 3) = 1 by (3.51). Gale evenness requires v(3d +4) = 
1, which leads to the same argument as before. Repeating this shows that v(sk) = 1 for all 
k=1,...,d. 
All other complementary vertex pairs give Nash equilibria of the game. If v(sd) = 0, 
then exactly one of v(pd), v(qd), or v(rd) is 1 by (3.51). If, say, v(qd) = v(d +1) = 1, then 
v(pd) =v(d)-= 0, so that by Gale evenness, v(qd_i) = 1. This holds analogously for rd or 
pd instead of qd. Hence, (3.51) implies, in particular, that v(sd_1) = 0. In the same way 
as for the artificial equilibrium, this implies v(sk) = 0 for all k = 1, . . .,d, which shows 
the full support of the equilibrium. The l's in v come in pairs, where v(i) = v(i + 1) = 1 
for odd i, for any of the three choices pi, q2d 	or ri-2d for i, subject to (3.51). This 
gives 3d/2 Nash equilibria. 	 ❑ 
For T(d), I U (d)1 = (31) = 0((27/4)d/-\/), using Stirling's formula. Hence, asymp-
totically I U (d)I — IN(d)I is IU (d) I, and E(d) in (3.41) is exponential for the games T(d), 
as it is for the games F(d, 2d). 
Given the description of the equilibria of T(d) in Lemma 3.20, it is not hard to see that 
the LH paths for these games correspond to one of the "Lemke paths" of Morris (1994). 
We only give a short summary here. Essentially, a dropped label corresponding to one 
of the 3d pure strategies of player 1 changes to another vertex of the simplotope P. This 
corresponds to one edge traversal in the kth tetrahedron, for some k where 1 < k < d. 
Correspondingly, the respective bit v(sk) of the vertex v in the artificial equilibrium is 
changed from 1 to 0. (This happens directly when the initially dropped label corresponds 
to a strategy of player 2.) The steps in Q, which happen every other time, then mimic 
the steps in Morris's path, except that the cyclic symmetry of the bitstrings in G(d, 4d) 
that represent Q is used so that throughout the path, either only bits (in positions) pk are 
affected, or only bits rk, in addition to the bits sk; the bits qk stay at 0. This mimicking 
is analogous to the use of (3.51) above. As a result, the bit pattern in G(d, 4d) in the 
equilibrium that is found is either 1 d03d or 02d i d od 
The length of the shortest path is C1((1 + -1 -2-)d/4/4), given as 1.24... d in (3.8). 
Figure 3.10 summarizes the time complexity for the games F(d, d), F(d, 2d), and T(d) 
for both support enumeration and the best-case behaviour of the LH algorithm. 
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time complexity for 
challenge instances 
(constants omitted) 
expected number 
of guesses among 
all supports 
expected number 
of guesses among 
full supports 
length of 
shortest 
LH path 
1-(d, d) 
r(d, 2d) 
T(d) 
2d 
 2.79...d/fa 
5.47...d/fa 
1 
1.65...d/fd 
3.89...d / iii 
1.43...d 
 1.43...d
 1.24...d
Figure 3.10 Summary of time complexity of support enumeration and the LH algorithm for the 
games r(d,d), r(d,2d), and T(d). 
3.9 A pair of labelled dual cyclic polytopes with no com- 
pletely labelled vertex pair 
Let d be odd. Consider two identical dual cyclic polytopes R and S in dimension d with 
2d facets. The vertices of R and S are described by the sets of bitstrings G(d, 2d). The 
facet labels are defined by permutations / and 1 / of 1, , 6 for R and S, respectively. For 
a vertex u of R, its labels are given by 1(k) where uk = 1. The kth facet of R has label 
1(k) = k, so 1 is simply the identity permutation. A vertex v of S has labels l'(k) where 
vk = 1, for 1 < k < 2d. The kth facet of S has label l'(k). The permutation // is defined as 
follows: 
r (k) = 
{
k, k= 1,2,2d —1,2d 
k— (-1)k , 3 < k < 2d— 2, 
(3.52) 
Remark 3.21 No vertex of the product polytope R x S is completely labelled. 
Proof Suppose, to the contrary, that there is a completely labelled vertex pair (u, v) E 
G(d,2d) x G(d,2d). Because d is odd, for any vertex w E G(d, 2d), we have Iv' = 1, 
wed = 1, or both, by Gale evenness. Suppose ui = 1, which is without loss of generality 
by symmetry. Then, by complementarity, v1 = 0, so in turn v2d = 1 and u2d = 0. We 
64 
depict the situation for d = 5. 
R S 
label 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 4 3 6 5 8 7 9 10 
(u, v) 1 0 0 1 
Suppose u2d_1 = 1. Then U2d-2 = 1, by Gale evenness. So, by complementarity, V2d-3 = 
V2d_1 = 0. Then v2d_2 = 0, by Gale evenness. By repeatedly applying complementarity 
and Gale evenness in this way, we see that 143 = u4 = • • = u2d_2 = 1, which is a contra-
diction, because u has exactly d bits that are 1. So u2d_1 = 0. Similarly, v 2 = 0. Thus, we 
have the following situation. 
R S 
label 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 4 3 6 5 8 7 9 10 
(u,v) 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
So /43 = 1, by Gale evenness, since d is odd. Then, v4 = 0 by complementarity, and con- 
sequently v3 = 0 by Gale evenness. Thus, by complementarity, 124 = 0, and consequently 
= 1 by Gale evenness. By repeatedly applying complementarity and Gale evenness in 
this way, we see that u1 = u2 = • • • = U2d —2 = 1, which is a contradiction, because u has 
exactly d bits that are 1. ❑ 
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Chapter 4 
A Unified View of Complementary 
Pivoting Algorithms for Bimatrix 
Games 
The LH algorithm finds one solution to an LCP (2.2) derived from a bimatrix game. The 
closely related algorithm by Lemke (1965), which we describe in Section 4.3, solves more 
general LCPs. In Section 4.4, we describe the LCP map and complementary cones view 
of LCPs (e.g., Megiddo (1986)). The LCP corresponding to a bimatrix game can, without 
loss of generality, be defined by a positive matrix. We show that this implies that the 
LCP map is surjective. Then, in Section 4.6, we explain Lemke's algorithm using this 
complementary cones view (e.g., Eaves and Scarf (1976)), which is useful for analyzing 
the expected running time of Lemke's algorithm for LCPs, and the corresponding self-
dual parametric simplex algorithm for LPs (for more details, see Section 5.2). 
In Section 4.7, we present a new unified view of the LH algorithm and Lemke's algo-
rithm via complementary cones; so far such a view was not known. Finally, we extend 
Lemke's algorithm to give more freedom when starting the algorithm. Before we describe 
Lemke's algorithm for general LCPs, in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 we first justify restricting our 
attention to finding symmetric equilibria of symmetric bimatrix games with cost matrices, 
as this simplifies our exposition of complementary cones. 
The new research in this chapter appears in Sections 4.5, 4.7, and 4.8. 
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4.1 Finding symmetric equilibria of symmetric games 
In this section, we argue that we can focus on finding symmetric equilibria of symmet-
ric bimatrix games, rather than finding Nash equilibria of general bimatrix games. The 
symmetrization (2.3) shows that the symmetric problem is no easier than the general one, 
and since symmetric equilibria of a game (C, CT ) are exactly the Nash equilibria of the 
imitation game (C,/) (see Section 3.7), the symmetric problem is also no harder than the 
general one. Thus, the problem of finding a symmetric equilibrium of a symmetric game 
is polynomially equivalent to finding a Nash equilibrium of a general bimatrix game. 
The imitation game construction shows that a symmetric game must have at least 
one symmetric equilibrium. The symmetric LH algorithm described in Section 2.2 also 
shows this, as does a simple modification of Nash's original proof of the existence of Nash 
equilibria in general finite games, which also appears in his seminal paper (Nash (1951)). 
It is also worth noting that the standard LH algorithm finds an odd number of equilibria 
for a nondegenerate game, as equilibria are all endpoints of paths, with one endpoint 
being the artificial equilibrium. Then, since a symmetric game has an even number of 
nonsymmetric equilibria (they come in pairs, because the players can be exchanged), it 
must have at least one symmetric equilibrium. 
4.2 Costs instead of payoffs 
As stated at the start of Section 2.2, the symmetric equilibria of a symmetric bimatrix 
game (C, CT ) defined by payoff matrices are the nonzero solutions of an LCP (M, q), with 
M = —C and q = 1. Since zero is a solution of this LCP, but is not a Nash equilibrium, it 
is sometimes convenient to rewrite the bimatrix game with costs instead of payoffs, with 
costs obtained from payoffs by negation. In fact, the original LH algorithm, which we 
discuss below, used the cost setup. 
In the cost setup, as we did for payoffs, we use normalized payoffs of 1, which only 
works if all costs are positive, as we now describe. Given a symmetric n x n game defined 
by a cost matrix C for player 1, against a mixed strategy y of player 2 , the expected costs 
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for the rows are given by Cy. The best response cost against y is 
min (Cy ) 
	
(4.1) 
Denote by ek the unit vector with kth component equal to 1 and all others 0. 
Lemma 4.1 The best response cost is always positive if and only if C > 0. 
Proof: Suppose cif < 0 for some i and j. Then against y = e the best response is i with 
cost cij < 0. If C > 0 then Cy > 0, since y > 0 and ly = 1. 	 ❑ 
If C > 0, then, with y > 0 and ly = 1, mini (Cy)4 = v if and only if (Cy)1 > v for all i, 
and (Cy)i = v for some i. Then, we can divide by v, which is positive by Lemma 4.1, and 
preserve the inequalities. This gives (CA> 1 for all i, and (Cy% = 1 for some i, with 
= y • 1/v, and y' > 0 and y' 0. The requirement that C > 0 is not restrictive, since a 
constant can be added to all entries without changing the equilibria. 
So, rather than considering the polyhedron 
H = {(y,v) ERn xR I y > 0, ly = 1, Cy > lv}, 
we consider the polyhedron 
W = {z E 	z > 0, Cz > 	 (4.2) 
which is a projective transformation of the polyhedron 
{(y,v) ElrxRly> 0, ly = 1, Cy > lv, v > 0}. 
This projective transformation has normalised the best response costs to 1. See von Sten-
gel (2002, p. 1735) for details of the corresponding projective transformation for payoffs. 
We have used such a normalization for payoffs in Section 2.1; W is the analogue of S 
in (2.1). The polyhedron H is not full dimensional, but having eliminated the equation 
ly = 1 by the projective transformation, the polyhedron W is full dimensional. The poly-
hedron W is not bounded, unlike S, and is not a polytope; it is like the polytope S "turned 
inside out". Each of the orthant-facets is a facet of W, corresponding to an unplayed pure 
strategy. In S, the corresponding facets all intersect at the origin, which is the artificial 
equilibrium. With costs, there is no artificial equilibrium, which is exactly the trivial so-
lution of the LCP we have chosen to avoid. Except for this, the facet incidences of W and 
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S are the same, which would not be the case if C was not positive, as some orthant-facet 
would be "chopped off". Figure 4.1 gives an example, where 
C
= /2 1) 
1 3) 
	 (4.3) 
so the polyhedron is {(zi ,Z2) T E R2 I zi > 0, Z2 > 0, 2Z1 +z2 > 1, Zi +3z2 > 1), 
and the game has a unique, completely mixed symmetric equilibrium. 
Figure 4.1 The best response polyhedron for cost matrix C 
Equilibria of the symmetric game (C, C T ) defined by a positive cost matrix C are those 
points in W that satisfy the complementarity condition 
zi- (cz —1) = o. 	 (4.4) 
Thus the symmetric equilibria of (C, CT ) are the solutions of the LCP (M, q), with M = C 
and q = —1. 
With the cost setup, the LH path with missing label k comes in along the extreme ray 
of W that is part of the coordinate axis for zk (where zi = 0 for all i k) , until it hits 
some facet of the polyhedron. As usual, if the label of this facet is the missing label k 
we are done, otherwise it is a duplicate label and we continue pivoting, according to the 
complementary pivot rule. The path terminates when the label k is picked up, that is, 
when either zk or the slack variable wk = 1 — (Cz)k leaves the basis. 
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4.3 Lemke's algorithm 
In this section, we describe the complementary pivoting algorithm due to Lemke (1965), 
which can solve a general LCP (2.2), and not just a bimatrix game. Lemke's algorithm is 
closely related to the LH algorithm. In Section 4.7, we describe a unified view of these 
two algorithms (as applied to bimatrix games). 
Our exposition in this section, except for Corollary 4.3, which is trivial, and Figure 4.2, 
is to a large extent taken verbatim from Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel (1996), which 
in turn refers to Murry (1988, pp. 63-84) and Cottle, Pang and Stone (1992, pp. 270-280 
and 336-342). 
Given an n-vector q and an n x n matrix M, the LCP is to find two n-vectors z and w 
so that 
z> 0, 	w> 0, 
w=q+Mz, 	 (4.5) 
zTw = 0, 
or to determine that no such vectors exist. The system (4.5) is equivalent to the definition 
(2.2) of an LCP given above, with the slack vector w introduced. Lemke's algorithm 
either finds a solution to (4.5) or terminates in a well-defined way, called ray termination, 
without a solution. For certain classes of matrices, ray termination implies that the LCP 
has no solution. Theorem 4.2, proved below, is such a result for the special vector q and 
matrix M in our application; since that LCP has always at least one solution, a solution 
will be found by Lemke's algorithm. 
Complementary Pivoting 
Because the vectors z and w in (4.5) are nonnegative, the orthogonality condition z T w = 0 
is equivalent to 
ZiWi = 
	for i = 1,...,n. 	 (4.6) 
Since this means that zi or wi has to be zero, each of these two variables is called the 
complement of the other, for 1 < i < n. 
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It is useful to generalize the system (4.5) by introducing an n-vector d with positive 
components (for example, d = (1,...,1)T), called the covering vector, and an auxiliary 
variable zo. Let I denote the n x n identity matrix. The generalized problem is that of 
finding w > 0, zo > 0, and z > 0 so that 
lw— dzo—Mz= q 	 (4.7) 
and (4.6) hold. A solution w, zo, z to this problem is called almost complementary. It is a 
solution to (4.5) if zo = 0. 
In (4.7), the vector q is represented as a nonnegative linear combination of certain 
columns of the matrix [I, —d, —M]. Like the simplex and LH algorithms, Lemke's algo-
rithm computes with basic feasible solutions of this system. For the moment, we assume 
that these are all nondegenerate, so that the basic variables are always positive; this can 
always be achieved by slightly perturbing q; we will come back to the corresponding 
lexicographic rules that are applied in the case of degeneracy. 
Lemke's algorithm is very similar to the LH algorithm, using the same complementary 
pivoting rule. In the algorithm, almost complementary basic feasible solutions to (4.7) are 
iteratively changed by pivoting operations. An initial solution of this kind is easily found. 
Let z = 0, which implies (4.6). If zo is sufficiently large and w = q dzo, then w is 
nonnegative since d > 0, and (4.7) is fulfilled. The set of these almost complementary 
solutions is called the primary ray. Let zo be minimal such that q+ dzo > 0 (and zo > 0). 
If zo = 0, that is, q > 0, then the LCP (4.5) is solved with w = q, z = 0. Otherwise, zo 
is positive, and at least one component wi of the vector w = q+ dzo is zero. Then the 
variables w1 for j i and zo are basic variables since the corresponding columns of I and 
the covering vector d are linearly independent. This yields the first almost complementary 
basic feasible solution to (4.7). 
For the central step of the algorithm, consider any almost complementary basic feasi-
ble solution where zo is basic. The n basic variables are positive by nondegeneracy, and 
include at most one variable of each complementary pair by (4.6). Thus, there is pre-
cisely one such pair zi, wi where both variables are nonbasic and have value zero (this is 
the duplicate label that we know from the LH algorithm). If either variable is increased 
while maintaining the linear relationship (4.7), this will still be an almost complementary 
solution as long as the variables stay nonnegative. For the initial solution, increasing wt 
71 
results in the primary ray. Therefore, the complement zi of wi is increased until some 
other basic variable xi becomes zero. This is implemented as a pivot with zi as entering 
and xj as leaving variable. If the leaving variable xi is zo, a solution to the original LCP is 
at hand. Otherwise, there is again a pair zi, w j of complementary variables that are both 
nonbasic. One of them is the variable xi that has just left the basis. Again, its complement 
is chosen as the new entering variable, and the process is repeated. 
Lemke's algorithm has a geometric view. The set of all nonnegative solutions to (4.7) 
is a polyhedron where the basic feasible solutions are the vertices. For this system, the 
almost complementary solutions are certain edges of the polyhedron. The algorithm traces 
a unique almost complementary path consisting of such edges. The path starts with the 
primary ray, whose endpoint corresponds to the first basis. A move from vertex to vertex 
along an edge represents a pivoting operation, which is uniquely determined by the pair 
of complementary variables that are both nonbasic at the respective vertex, and by the 
direction on the path. 
The leaving variable is decided according to the complementary pivoting rule. For the 
simplex algorithm for linear programming a different rule, based on improving the objec-
tive function, is used to determine the leaving variable. In both cases, and for pivoting in 
general, the entering variable is chosen so as to preserve feasibility, This is done using the 
so-called minimum ratio test, which we now describe briefly. 
Entering and Leaving Variables 
We want to pivot from one basic solution of the system of linear equations Ax = b, to 
another. Consider a basic feasible solution with basis B, and let N denote the index set of 
the nonbasic columns. The following equations are equivalent for any x: 
Ax = b, 
ABxB±ANxN = b, 
XB = Ai l u — AB 1ANxN • 	 (4.8) 
Equation (4.8), called a "dictionary" by Chvatal (1983, p. 98), expresses the basic vari- 
ables x/3 in terms of the nonbasic variables xN, in particular for the basic feasible solution 
with xN = 0. Assume that all components of xN are kept zero except xi. We denote the 
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entering column AB 'Ai  by e, and the right hand side AB—l b by r. Then, (4.8) has the form 
xB = r — 	 (4.9) 
For xi = 0, (4.9) represents the current basic feasible solution xB = r. How long does -x13 
stay nonnegative if xi is gradually increased? If e has no positive components, then xi 
can be made arbitrarily large (for the simplex algorithm this would signify an unbounded 
LP, for Lemke's algorithm this is ray termination). Otherwise, some components ej of e 
are positive. These impose an upper bound on the choice of xi in (4.9) so that xB stays 
nonnegative, by the following minimum ratio test: 
xi = min {ri/ei fej > 0} . 	 (4.10) 
The components of the vector r— ext, like the rows of Ai l , are indexed with the elements 
j of B. With xi determined by (4.10), at least one of these components is zero, and the 
corresponding variable xi is made the leaving variable and becomes nonbasic. We obtain 
a new feasible solution where the entering variable xi is set as in (4.10), and the remaining 
basic variables in xB (except xi) are changed according to (4.9). 
The system Ax = b is here (4.7), with A = [I, —d, —M] and x = (w, zo, z) T . The basic 
variables xi for j E B are given by zo and one variable of each complementary pair zi, 
except one, that is, for 1 < j < n, j i. The entering variable xi is either zi or w i depending 
on which of these two variables has just left the basis. In (4.9), there is a maximum choice 
of xi such that r—exi> 0 provided the entering column e has positive components. It may 
indeed happen that e < 0, and in that case xi can be increased indefinitely; the resulting 
almost complementary solutions constitute what is called the secondary ray. In that case, 
Lemke's algorithm stops without a solution to the LCP (4.5), just as the simplex algorithm 
terminates when processing an unbounded LP. This is called ray termination of Lemke's 
algorithm. As mentioned, it can be excluded for certain q and M; we will describe a 
special case below. 
If the entering column e in (4.9) has a positive component, then the minimum ratio 
test (4.10) determines the value of the entering variable xi and a unique leaving variable 
because after pivoting, the new basis is nondegenerate. In that way, the algorithm gener-
ates a sequence of almost complementary basic feasible solutions that each have a unique 
predecessor and successor (joined by the edges of the almost complementary path). Thus, 
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a basis cannot be repeated. If Lemke's algorithm does not terminate with a secondary ray, 
it will therefore find a solution to the LCP (4.5), since eventually zo must leave the basis. 
In summary, Lemke's algorithm consists of the following steps. We refer to the system 
(4.7) as Ax = b as described, and identify a basis B of that system by its set of basic 
variables, a subset of {w1, • • • , All nonbasic variables have value zero. 
We determine the first almost complementary basic feasible solution using a pivot where 
zo enters and wi leaves the basis, starting with an infeasible basic solution where w = b, 
zo = 0, and z = 0. 
0. (Initialization.) Input q, d, M. Let the basic variables be wl , , wn , with w = b = q and 
zo = 0, z = 0. If b > 0, then stop: this is a solution to (4.5) 1 . Otherwise, consider the 
index i such that —bi/di is maximal, where bi < 0; that index is unique by nondegen-
eracy. Pivot with wi leaving and zo (at value —bi/di) entering the basis. The resulting 
basic solution is feasible and almost complementary. Choose the complement zi of wi 
as the new entering variable. 
1. If the entering column e in (4.9) is nonpositive, then stop: ray termination, no solution 
to (4.5) has been found. Otherwise, the minimum ratio test (4.10) determines the 
leaving variable, which is unique by nondegeneracy. 
2. Pivot. If the leaving variable has been zo, then stop: a solution to (4.5) is found. 
Otherwise, choose the complement of the most recent leaving variable as the new 
entering variable. Go back to Step 1. 
Degeneracy Resolution 
The almost complementary path computed by Lemke's algorithm is unique only if the 
leaving variable in Step 1 is unique. If this is not the case, then the system (4.7) has 
degenerate basic feasible solutions, and Lemke's algorithm may cycle unless the leaving 
variable is chosen in a systematic way. 
In Lemke's algorithm, degeneracy can be resolved by the lexicographic method. Intu-
itively, the vector q is slightly perturbed by replacing it by q(E) = q (s,... , e)T, where 
I We omit this check for solving bimatrix games: with a cost setup b = q = ( — 1 , . . . , — 1) T < 0 and the 
check is irrelevant. 
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£ is positive but vanishingly small. The minimum ratio test (4.10) is replaced by the 
lexico-minimum ratio test, which determines the leaving variable uniquely. It preserves 
the invariant that all computed basic solutions are lexico-feasible. Equivalently, all ba-
sic variables in the perturbed system are positive; since that system is nondegenerate, 
the computed almost complementary path will again be unique. For details see Chvatal 
(1983), for example. 
The invariant must be established for the first almost complementary basic feasible 
solution computed in Step 0, given by w = q+ dzo. This solution may be degenerate if 
there is a tie among the maximal ratios —qildi for qi < 0. If (4.7) is perturbed, replacing 
q by q(E), then these ratios are —qildi—Ei lqi, so that the maximum is attained uniquely 
for the largest index i among those ties. This rule has to be applied in Step 0 (it is not 
correct to break ties arbitrarily as suggested by Murty (1988, p. 80)). In that way, the 
first almost complementary basic solution is lexico-feasible, and using subsequently the 
lexico-minimum ratio test, Lemke's algorithm will terminate after a finite number of steps. 
Excluding Ray Termination 
We want to use Lemke's algorithm for computing an equilibrium of a bimatrix game. For 
that, it is important to exclude ray termination. Theorem 4.2, which excludes ray termi-
nation under certain conditions, and its application to finding a Nash equilibrium of an 
extensive game (game tree), appeared in Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel (1994; 1996). 
The theorem is based on Theorem 4.4.13 of Cottle, Pang and Stone (1992, p. 277); as 
mentioned by these authors (p. 377), the theorem is partly implicit in the works by Lemke 
(1965) and Cottle and Dantzig (1968), as we will indicate. We restate and prove this the-
orem here, for the general case where degeneracy is allowed. It is assumed that Lemke's 
algorithm uses a positive covering vector d and operates with lexicographic degeneracy 
resolution as described above. For a more general study of excluding ray termination see 
Eaves (1971). 
Theorem 4.2 If (i) zT Mz> 0 for all z > 0, and (ii) z > 0, Mz > 0 and zT Mz = 0 imply 
zTq > 0, then Lemke's algorithm computes a solution of the LCP (4.5) and does not 
terminate with a secondary ray. 
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Proof: Let M and q fulfill (i) and (ii), and assume to the contrary that Lemke's algo-
rithm terminates with a secondary ray. The endpoint of this ray shall be denoted by 
x = (w,zo,z) T . This is a basic feasible solution of (4.7), where the vector xB of basic 
variables includes zo since it would otherwise solve the LCP (4.5). We assume first that 
this solution is nondegenerate, that is, all components of xB, in particular zo, are positive. 
Ray termination implies that the entering column e in equation (4.9) is nonpositive. 
The elements of the secondary ray result if xi in that equation takes any nonnegative 
value. These elements shall be written as x+ Xi for X > 0. The vector I = Z) T is 
nonnegative; its components are the components of —e, a one for its ith component (with 
= xi), and zero otherwise. In particular, x 0 0. 
The elements x A2 of the secondary ray are solutions to (4.7), that is, 
w -1-24 = q 	d(zo-FX2O) 	M(z-FX2') 	 (4.11) 
for all X > 0, and these solutions are almost complementary, 
(z + Xi) r (w X0) = 0. 	 (4.12) 
Equation (4.11) with X = 0 and X, = 1 implies 
IT; = dio+M .2. 	 (4.13) 
This implies Z' 0 0: otherwise, 20 > 0 since I 0 0 and thus 4 0 in (4.13), which implies 
w > 0 because d > 0, so that by (4.12), z = 0, which means that the secondary ray 
is the primary ray, contradicting the fact that we have a path. 
Equation (4.12) and 2 > 0 imply 2-r4 = 0, and thus by (4.13), 
0 =.Z-1- 1;v." = *Z"Tdio 
This equation has been stated by Lemke (1965, p. 687, equation (20) with Zo = uo, i = it), 
and by Cottle and Dantzig (1968, p. 116, equation (37)). It implies Zo = 0 since 2 is non-
negative and nonzero and d > 0, and since the last term is nonnegative by assumption (i). 
Thus, 2T  M2= 0, and by (4.13), W." = M2 > 0. Assumption (ii) implies •Z-T q > 0. We derive 
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a contradiction to this conclusion as follows, using (4.12), (4.11), and (i): 
o 	+ 2,z)T(w + ?a) 
= (z+X2')T (q + dzo + M(z+Xi)) 
+ X) T (q + dzo) 
= zT (q + dzo) +XiT (q + d zo) • 
The last term is nonpositive for all X > 0 only if -ZT  (q + dzo) < 0, or equivalently, Zi-q < 
(dzo) < 0, contradicting (ii). 
We have shown that (i) and (ii) exclude ray termination unless (4.7) has a degenerate 
solution where zo is a basic variable but has value zero. This does not pose any problem 
since if there is a tie in Step 1 of the algorithm, one could first check if zo can leave 
the basis even before invoking the lexicographic rule, which then yields a solution of the 
LCP. However, we show that this additional check, although it might possibly shorten the 
computation, is not necessary. 
That is, assume that there is a secondary ray with endpoint x = (w, zo, z) T as above 
where zo is basic, but now has value zero. Because this basic feasible solution has 
been computed using lexicographic degeneracy resolution, there is a perturbation of (4.7) 
where q is replaced by q(E) = q+ (a, , E9 T for some small positive a, where the same 
basis defines a (perturbed) solution x that is nondegenerate so that zo is positive. For the 
perturbed system, there is still a secondary ray since the nonpositive entering column e 
in (4.9) does not depend on q. With the same argument as before, we can now conclude 
Z-rb(E) < 0, which is again a contradiction to (ii) since 21- q (E) =_ 27 > 
z-T q. This shows that the theorem holds even if Lemke's algorithm encounters degenerate 
solutions, provided it uses the lexicographic method. ❑ 
Corollary 4.3 Lemke's algorithm (with d > 0) will always find a Nash equilibrium of a 
bimatrix game. 
Proof: We can assume w.l.o.g. that M > 0, in which case the conditions of Theorem 4.2 
are trivially satisfied. 	 ❑ 
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We end this section with Figure 4.2, an illustration of using Lemke's algorithm with 
covering vector d = (2,1) T to find a symmetric equilibrium of the 2 x 2 symmetric game 
with C as in (4.3) (so Figure 4.2 corresponds to Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.2 An illustration of Lemke's algorithm 
4.4 The LCP map and complementary cones 
In this section, we describe the LCP map and the complementary cones view of LCPs 
and complementary pivot methods (e.g., Eaves and Scarf (1976)). A linear program is a 
special case of an LCP (e.g., Smale (1983)), and Lemke's algorithm applied to a linear 
program corresponds to a variant of the simplex algorithm called the self-dual parametric 
simplex algorithm (Dantzig (1963, p. 245)). The complementary cones view is particu-
larly useful for the probabilistic analysis of Lemke's algorithm (Megiddo (1986)), and the 
self-dual parametric simplex algorithm (Smale (1983), Adler and Megiddo (1985)). 
We begin with some definitions. First, the definition of a cone, which is the usual, 
well-known operator. It is applied to a set of vectors, X = {x',.. . , xN } C I '.' , and produces 
the set of all positive combinations of these vectors, 
cone(X) = { i Xixi I X E RN , X > 0}. 	 (4.14) 
i=i 
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Let a C { 1, , n}. Next, we define the usual orthants of Rn , where a denotes the set of 
positive unit vectors of the basis of the orthant. The a—orthant of IEV is 
cone(fei,—ej i c a, j 	 (4.15) 
It is relevant because the LCP map, introduced below, maps orthants to complementary 
cones, which we define next. Given an n x n matrix M, denote by Mi the ith column of M. 
The complementary cone C(a) is 
cone({Mi, 	I i e a, j a}). 	 (4.16) 
Nonnegative n-vectors z and w are a solution to the LCP (4.5) if and only if they satisfy 
the complementarity condition (4.6), and 
—q = Mz— w . 	 (4.17) 
With a = 	zi > 01, this is equivalent to —q belonging to a complementary cone, i.e., 
—q E C(a) = cone({Mi,—e I i E a, j ct a}). 	 (4.18) 
See Figure 4.3 for an illustration. Let x+ = max{xj, 0} and x = min-txi, 01. The LCP 
map, F : IEBn —> IV, is defined by 
F(x) = Mx+ + 	 (4.19) 
The LCP map F, which is piecewise linear, maps orthants to complementary cones, 
that is, F(a—orthant) = C(a), and F is the identity map on the negative orthant (a = 0). 
4.5 Surjective LCP map for M > 0 
In this section, we show that if M > 0 then the LCP map F is surjective. 
Lemma 4.4 For M > 0, F is surjective, that is, given p e Rn there exists x E Rn such that 
F (x) = Mx+ - = p . 
Proof: Let p E Rn be given. We find an x such that F(x) = p in two stages. First, we find 
the positive components of x. Let a = {i I pi > 0}. Consider the following LCP, which 
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uses only the rows i E a, 
Vi E a , xi > 0, E (miilpi)xi > 1, xi ( E, (mu! pi )xi —1) = 0 . 	(4.20) 
jEa 	 jEa 
This LCP has M > 0 and q = — 1. Therefore, the solutions of (4.20) are the symmet-
ric Nash equilibria of the I al x lad symmetric game with cost matrix for player 1 equal 
to (miil pi) for i, j E a. Since every symmetric game has at least one symmetric Nash 
equilibrium (see Section 4.1), at least one solution, say x. E Ra, to (4.20) exists. Let 
13 = {i I 4 > 0}. If i E 13, we have (EjEcc(mii/Pi)xi = 1 by complementarity. We set 
xi = 4 > 0 for i E p, giving the positive components of x. 
Second, we choose for all k 13 the nonpositive components of x. By definition, we 
have pk < 0 for k a. Since M is positive and xi > 0 for i E 13, we have Eio MkjXj > 0 
for all k, in particular k p. By complementarity in (4.20), we have E iomki > pk for 
i E a \ P. So, for k 013, we can set xk < 0 such that 
E mkjx; +Xk = Pk • 
ief3 
Thus, we have F(x) = p. 	 ❑ 
A matrix M is called a P-matrix if all its principal minors are positive, i.e. det(Maa) > 
0 for all a c {1,..., n}. Equivalently, M is a P-matrix if for any q the LCP (M, q) has a 
unique solution. This is the case if and only if the LCP map is bijective; see e.g., Cottle, 
Pang, and Stone (1992). As an example, the matrix M = C in (4.3) is a P-matrix, since 
det(MW,l) = 2 > 0, det(M2,2) = 3 > 0, and det(M12,12) = det(M) =5 > 0, and Figure 4.3 
shows the corresponding bijective LCP map. 
4.6 Lemke's algorithm and complementary cones 
In this section, we describe how Lemke's algorithm can be viewed in terms of comple-
mentary cones and the LCP map (see Megiddo (1986) or Eaves and Scarf (1976)). 
The algorithm with covering vector d, can be seen as inverting the piecewise linear 
map F(x) along the line segment [—d, 
F(x) = Mx+ + = (—d)(1 	(—q)(t) (0 < t < 1) 	(4.21) 
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Figure 43 A bijective LCP map F with a P-matrix M. With q = (1,1) T , the unique solution of 
the LCP has support {z1 ,z2}, since —q is contained uniquely in the complementary 
cone spanned by columns MI and M2. If we exchange the columns of M it is no 
longer a P-matrix, the LCP map is not injective, and the LCP has three solutions, 
with supports {zi } ,{z2}, and {zI,z2}, corresponding to the complementary cones 
spanned by MI and —e2, —ei and M2, and MI and M2, respectively. 
Figure 4.4 gives an illustration. At each basic solution in the standard view of the algo-
rithm, the basic variables correspond to a nonzero components of x in (4.21), where there 
are exactly n — 1 such variables excluding zo, so we are on at some point on a facet of 
a complementary cone. Each pivot in the standard view of the algorithm corresponds to 
crossing one of the complementary cones from one facet to another. Since the LCP map is 
not necessarily bijective, we must specify which complementary cone is crossed next, if 
there is more that one cone on the other side of the current cone-facet (this clarifies what 
is meant by "inverting" the map F along [—d, —q]). In each pivoting step, one variable 
enters the basis and one variable leaves. It is the entering variable that determines which 
complementary cone is crossed next. As in the standard view of Lemke's algorithm, the 
entering variable is determined by the complementary pivot rule: The duplicate label (the 
complement of the label that was just picked up) enters the basis. 
Even if the LCP map is surjective the algorithm may terminate with a secondary ray, 
rather than a solution to the LCP; see Section 4.8 for an example. 
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We now show the correspondence between (4.21) and w > 0, z > 0, zo > 0, (4.6), and 
(4.7). We divide (4.21) by t, the parameter of the convex combination of -d and -q, 
which only works for positive t. 
for t > 0 :Mx+ (l/t)-Fx- (1/t) = (-d)(1 -t)/t+ (-q) 
Mz - w = (-d)zo+(-q), z > 0, w > 0, and (4.6) holds. 
Thus, the change of variables z = x+/t, w = -x- /t, and zo = (1 - t)/t shows the cor-
respondence. So, 0 < t < 1 corresponds to C.3 > zo > 0. 
Figure 4.4 Lemke's algorithm as inverting the piecewise linear LCP map F along the line seg-
ment [—d, —q]. The computation involves four basic solutions, corresponding to the 
endpoints —d and —q, and the facets of the complementary cones that the line seg-
ment crosses. Thus, the computation involves three pivoting steps. 
Lemke's algorithm succeeds only if 
F -I [(1 -t)(-d)+4-q)] 0 for every t E [0, 1] . 	(4.22) 
Furthermore, viewed in terms of complementary cones, it is clear that when the LCP map 
is surjective (so (4.22) is satisfied) ray termination can only occur if -d is contained in 
more than one complementary cone. Ray termination is related to the non-monotonicity 
of t, or equivalently of zo = (1 - t)/t. When the LCP map is not bijective, the preimage 
of part of the line segment [-d, -q] may be "reflected back", so t decreases, into a cone 
(overlapping the previous cone) in an unbounded direction. As shown by Theorem 4.2, 
this is not possible for bimatrix games when starting in the negative orthant, i.e. d > 
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0 (because the preimage of the negative orthant under F is unique). For M > 0, ray 
termination is not possible in dimension 2, but an example in dimension 3 is given at the 
end of Section 4.8. 
In Section 4.8, we describe a simple extension of Lemke's algorithm: Rather than 
requiring d > 0, and thus starting in the negative orthant (with a = 0 in (4.16)), we can 
start in other complementary cones. In that case the algorithm may fail, even for bima-
trix games, when more than one complementary cone contains —d. For a general LCP, 
Lemke's algorithm may fail even if d > 0, but starting in other cones may allow one to 
find a solution. Of course, if there is at least one solution, one may be lucky and decide 
to start in one of the complementary cones containing —q; in this case, the extension is 
equivalent to guessing the support of a solution, solving a small system of linear equations 
by pivoting, and checking for feasibility. 
4.7 A unified view of Lemke's algorithm and the Lemke— 
Howson algorithm 
In this section, we give a unified view of the LH algorithm and Lemke's algorithm. The 
standard initialization of Lemke's algorithm requires that d > 0, and traditionally the 
covering vector d = 1 is used. We show that the LH algorithm, with missing label k, 
corresponds to Lemke's algorithm with a covering vector d = —ek. Since this covering 
vector is not positive, the first issue we must deal with is initialization: We initialize by 
pivoting zo into the basis and wk out. After this pivot, the basic solution is still infeasible. 
According to the complementary pivot rule, we pivot zk in (Mk is positive), and we start 
in the cone C({k}). 
Lemma 4.5 Lemke's algorithm with a covering vector d = —ek, initialized in this way, 
corresponds to the Lemke—Howson (LH) algorithm, with missing label k. 
Proof: The variable zo, which does not feature in the standard LH algorithm, is only 
involved in the first and last pivots of Lemke's algorithm with d = —ek. In the last pivot 
zo finally leaves the basis to give an equilibrium. There are two cases to distinguish: 
(i) zk > 0 in the equilibrium at the end of the LH path. Then, in the final pivot the entering 
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variable is identical to the entering variable of the final pivot in the standard LH algorithm. 
In this case, Lemke's algorithm with d = —ek takes one more pivot than the standard LH 
algorithm. 
(ii) zk = 0 in the equilibrium at the end of the LH path. Then the penultimate pivot is 
identical to the final pivot of the standard LH algorithm, and in the final pivot the entering 
variable is wk. So in this case, Lemke's algorithm with d = —ek takes two more pivots 
than the standard LH algorithm. ❑ 
We illustrate these two cases with the symmetric LH algorithm applied to the follow-
ing 3 x 3 symmetric game (C, CT ), defined by the cost matrix 
/4 1 2\ 
C = 1 4 2 
`2 2 1) 
It has a unique pure strategy symmetric equilibrium, where player 1 plays the third row 
(zi = 0, z2 = 0, and z3 > 0). Thus, applying the symmetric LH algorithm with zo will 
require one extra pivot with missing label 3, but two extra pivots with missing labels 1 
or 2. This is shown in Figure 4.5 for missing label 3, and in Figure 4.6 for missing label 2. 
LH no zo LH with zo 
Pivot Pivot 
In 	Out In 	Out 
ZO W3 
Z3 W3 Z3 ZO 
Figure 4.5 Pivots for the symmetric LH algorithm with missing label 3, with and without zo. 
LH no zo LH with zo 
Pivot Pivot 
In 	Out In 	Out 
ZO W2 
Z2 WI Z2 WI 
Z I W3 Z1 W3 
Z3 Z1 Z3 Z I 
WI Z2 W1 Z2 
W2 ZO 
Figure 4.6 Pivots for the symmetric LH algorithm with missing label 2, with and without zo. 
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4.8 Starting Lemke's algorithm in arbitrary cones 
The standard version of Lemke's algorithm uses a positive covering vector d, and inverts 
the piecewise linear map F along the line segment [—d, In the previous section we 
showed that, when taking d = —ek < 0, which corresponds to starting in the cone C({k}), 
Lemke's algorithm corresponds to the LH algorithm with missing label k. In fact, we 
can start the algorithm in any cone, as we describe in this section. However, unlike when 
d > 0 or d = —ek, we are not guaranteed to avoid ray termination for M > 0. Despite 
this potential problem, extending Lemke's algorithm in this way may be useful. Indeed, 
when Lemke's algorithm is run on a general LCP, there is no way to guarantee avoiding 
ray termination. 
We can try any d, provided we know x with F(2) = —d. So, for example, as we 
will do, we can choose d in an arbitrary cone and let d = —F(2). Instead of specifying 
a covering vector, we specify an 2 E 118n . In fact, the covering vector d is not explicitly 
used in this extended version of the algorithm, only 2. In the standard version of Lemke's 
algorithm we do use d, but this is because d is positive, so F -1 (—d) = —d 
Here is the modified initialization of Lemke's algorithm. Steps 1 and 2 are the same 
as the standard Lemke's algorithm on page 74. As usual, a = 	> 0} C {1, , n}. 
0. (Initialization.) Input 	Let the basic variables be wi — • , wn, with w = b and 
z = 0. At this point zo is not in the system. Pivot the variables {zi I i E a} into 
the basis, in any order, with the respective complement as the leaving variable. If 
b > 0, then stop: this is a solution to (4.5). Otherwise, augment the system with 
the nonbasic variable zo, with coefficients 121. Then, consider the index i such that 
—bilds is maximal, where bs< 0; that index is unique by nondegeneracy. Pivot with 
wi leaving and zo (at value —1,i/di) entering the basis. The resulting basic solution 
is feasible and almost complementary. Choose the complement zi of wi as the new 
entering variable. 
Define the matrix B as follows. 
Bi= 
{Ms, 
—es, 
i E oc, 
otherwise. 
(4.23) 
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We could have included zo in the system from the beginning (with coefficients d), 
but this would be a little wasteful, since the coefficients of zo after the first !al pivots are 
just the by construction: The pivoting operations that bring the variables {zi I i e a} 
into the basis are equivalent to multiplying the original system (4.7) by the inverse of the 
matrix B in (4.23). So 
= 	 (4.24) 
This modification of Lemke's algorithm first tests if there is an equilibrium corre-
sponding to the support a defined by x. If there is one, the algorithm terminates after the 
initialization step. This is done in essentially the same way as a support enumeration algo-
rithm, by solving the small system of linear equations and then testing for feasibility. So, 
this extension of Lemke's algorithm can easily be combined with support enumeration. 
We end this section with a 3 x 3 example of ray termination for M > 0. 
/ 4 1 3 \ 
Input : q = (- 1, — 1, — 1) , X= (-1,1,1)T , M= 	1 3 2 	(4.25) 
\2 2 1 
We start at the infeasible solution z = 0, w = q, which as a dictionary is 
w i = —1 + 4z1 + z2 + 3z3 
W2 = — 1 + Z1 + 3Z2 + 2Z3 
W3 = —1 +2Z1 + 2Z2 + Z3 • 
Pivoting in z2 and then z3 gives the dictionary 
wi = —3+ 13zi  +5W2 2-7W3, 
Z2 = — 1 — 3z1 —  W2 + 2W3 
Z3 = 	4Z1 2W2 31413 . 
(4.26) 
(4.27) 
If w and z were nonnegative we would have an equilibrium, and be done. This is not the 
case, so we augment the system with the nonbasic variable zo, which has coefficients 121. 
As mentioned previously, we could have included zo in the system from the beginning, but 
this would be a little wasteful, since the coefficients of zo are just the 21's by construction. 
The two pivoting operations that put the variables z2 and z3 into the basis are equivalent 
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to multiplying the original system (4.26) by the inverse of [—ei M2 M3], which is 
/ —1 1 3 \ I / —1 5 —7\ 
0 3 2 = 0 —1 2 
\ 0 2 1 / \ 0 2 —3 / 
and [—el M2 M3] -id = Ill by (4.24). The augmented dictionary is 
14'1 = — 3 + 13zi ±5w2 — 7w3 + lzo 
z2 = —1 — 3z1 —  w2 + 2w3 lzo 
Z3 = — 1 + 4z1 + 2w213w3 lzo 
Next we bring zo into the basis and start complementary pivoting. So zo enters the basis 
and wi leaves. Then zi enters the basis and Z3 leaves, which gives the dictionary 
9z0 = —1 + — 4w1 — 6w2 + 11w3 + 1323 , 
9z1 = —2 + — 7w1 — 6w2 4w3— Z3 
9z2 = —4 + 1w1 — 3w2 + 17w3 + 1623 . 
Next we try to bring w3 into the basis, but because all coefficients of w3 are positive, there 
is no restriction on feasibility as w3 is increased, and w3 and thus zo can become arbitrarily 
large. So, the algorithm terminates with a secondary ray. 
In summary, we may start Lemke's algorithm in any complementary cone, as de-
scribed above. When M > 0, which includes the case of bimatrix games, we are guar-
anteed to terminate with a solution if d > 0. Starting in other complementary cones, we 
may get ray termination, as the previous example shows, but this extension of Lemke's 
algorithm may still be useful (also for more general LCPs). 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Open Questions 
5.1 Recent results on PPAD-completeness 
In complexity theory, function problems are those that, as well as requiring a "yes/no" 
answer to a decision problem, require also a solution to accompany a "yes" answer. The 
class FNP of function problems in NP are those where a solution is verifiable in polyno-
mial time. If the decision problem is known to have a "yes" answer for any valid input, 
the problem is said to be total. NASH belongs to the complexity class TFNP of total func-
tion problems in NP (Papadimitriou (1994a, p. 229)): For the two-player case, with the 
bimatrix game as input, the required output are the mixed strategy probabilities, where 
the equilibrium property is verified in polynomial time. The class TFNP does not have 
complete problems unless NP = co-NP (Megiddo and Papadimitriou (1991)). 
Subclasses of TFNP are characterzied by the "proof technique" used to show totality 
of the problem. For the subclass of TFNP called PPAD, the problems are known to have 
a solution by a polynomial parity argument for directed graphs (Papadimitriou (1994b, 
p. 516)). The parity argument states that a directed graph (defined implicitly), where the 
indegree and outdegree of every node is at most one, consists of cycles and directed paths, 
so that there are as many starting points as endpoints of these paths. Formally, PPAD is 
defined as those problems in TFNP that are reducible to the following problem: 
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END OF THE LINE: 
Given two boolean circuits S and P, each with n input bits and n output bits, such that 
P(09 = 0" 0 S(0"), find an input x E {0, 1} 11 such that P(S(x) x or S(P(x)) x 0". 
Intuitively, END OF THE LINE creates an exponential-size directed graph with vertex set 
{0, }n and an edge from x to y whenever both y = S(x) and x = P (y) (S and P stand 
for successor and predecessor, respectively). All nodes in this graph have indegree and 
outdegree at most one, and there is at least one source, namely 0", so according to the 
parity argument there must be a sink. We seek either a sink, or a source other than 0". 
An instance of a problem in PPAD is specified by a polynomial-time algorithm for 
finding at least one starting point, and for finding the neighbour of a point in the graph 
or else declaring it as an endpoint. The possible endpoints (of which at least one exists) 
are the allowed function values. NASH belongs to PPAD, since using the LH algorithm 
it is easily reduced to END OF THE LINE. The LH algorithm uses a trivial artificial 
equilibrium as the starting point, has a freely chosen starting edge as a parameter, and then 
uses a unique "complementary" pivoting rule for determining the next "basic solution" 
(successor). It thereby traces the vertices of a certain polytope and ends at an equilibrium. 
The edges of the graph are directed (so the direction of the path can be determined even 
without knowing the past history) by a geometric orientation (Shapley (1974), see von 
Schemde (2005) for a recent discussion); see also Figure 2.1 above. 
The parity argument may be inefficient if the paths are not of polynomial length. We 
have shown explicitly that this inefficiency may occur for NASH, by giving games that 
produce exponentially long LH paths. 
For more than two players, a game may have only equilibria with irrational solutions 
(Nash (1951)). N-NASH, which is the problem of finding an approximate Nash equilib-
rium of an N-player game, also belongs to PPAD, shown by a reduction to END OF THE 
LINE via Brouwer's Theorem and Sperner's Lemma. Recently, there have been several 
important contributions towards understanding the computational complexity of N-NASH 
and NASH, in a series of preprints, which we now describe. 
The paper by Papadimitriou and Goldberg (2005) shows how to reduce N-NASH to 4-
NASH. In the paper by Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou (2005), it is shown that 
4-NASH is PPAD-complete, which implies that any other problem in the complexity class 
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PPAD, which includes most other problems related to equilibrium computation (Papadim-
itriou (1994b)), can be reduced to 4-NASH. Then, Chen and Deng (2005a), and indepen-
dently Daskalakis and Papadimitriou (2005), showed that 3-NASH is PPAD-complete, and 
very recently, Chen and Deng (2005b) showed that 2-NASH is also PPAD-complete. This 
would mean that a two-player game represents already the full complexity of the Nash 
equilibrium problem (with respect to polynomial-time algorithms). This result makes it 
unlikely that a polynomial-time algorithm for 2-NASH (and therefore NASH) exists, since 
such an algorithm would give a polynomial-time algorithm, for example, for computing 
Brouwer fixpoints. For large classes of algorithms that compute Brouwer fixed points 
of a given function (namely "black box" algorithms that merely evaluate the function, 
rather than using its description), Hirsch, Papadimitriou, and Vavasis (1989) have shown 
exponential lower bounds. 
5.2 Open questions 
A linear program (LP) can be formulated as an LCP, which captures the complementary 
slackness conditions that characterize a pair of optimal solutions to the primal and dual 
LP. Applied to such an LCP, Lemke's algorithm corresponds to the self-dual parametric 
simplex algorithm for solving LPs (Dantzig (1963, p. 245)). A special case of this is a 
parametric simplex algorithm where the right-hand side is parameterized, which Murty 
(1980) has shown to be exponential. Another special case is the parametric-objective 
simplex algorithm, which Goldfarb (1983; 1994) has shown to be exponential. 
For linear programming, despite the worst-case exponential behaviour of all known 
pivoting algorithms, they tend to work well in practice; this is also backed up by theo-
retical results (Spielman and Teng (2004)). For various models of random input data, the 
expected running time of the simplex algorithm is polynomial, in contrast to the worst-
case exponential behaviour (see Todd (2001, p. 422) for a survey). Smale (1983) and 
Adler and Megiddo (1985) give a probabilistic analysis for the self-dual parametric sim-
plex algorithm, using its description as a special case of Lemke's algorithm. 
This raises the following questions in the context of games. First, what is the expected 
running time of the LH algorithm? Megiddo (1986) analyzes Lemke's algorithm for 
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random general LCPs (not derived from games), and shows that its expected running time 
is exponential for the standard version of Lemke's algorithm, and quadratic for a modified 
version. Barány, Vempala, and Vetta (2005) show that with high probability, random 
games have equilibria with small support, so that an equilibrium is quickly found by 
support enumeration. Although this result does not concern the LH algorithm, it suggests 
that random games are riot "hard to solve". 
Secondly, is there a randomized variant of Lemke's algorithm that solves our games 
quickly on average? Von Stengel, van den Elzen, and Talman (2002) use a covering vector 
derived from a starting pair of mixed strategies to solve two-player games with Lemke's 
algorithm, and give a game-theoretic interpretation of the resulting path. The starting 
pair can be chosen randomly. Section 4.8 shows that more general random choices of the 
covering vector are also possible (which is true for any LCP). 
For the same model of random input data used by Smale (1983), Megiddo (1986) 
shows that the expected running time of Lemke's algorithm is exponential when the cov-
ering vector is (1, , 1) T , but quadratic when the covering vector is (E, E2 , E") T . If 
d = —q, degeneracy resolution must be used, since the path will go through the origin, 
which is in every complementary cone. By using appropriate lexicographic degeneracy 
resolution, it may be possible to emulate the good behaviour that results from the cov-
ering vector (a, a2 , , en)T , used by Megiddo. Such a starting point has the advantage 
that ray termination is not possible. Initial empirical evidence is encouraging, and this 
certainly deserves further theoretical study. An obvious related question is how the games 
constructed in this thesis are solved by such an algorithm. If the algorithm performs well 
in these cases, the natural question is whether there are hard instances for such an al-
gorithm, i.e. Lemke's algorithm with d = —q and appropriate lexicographic degeneracy 
resolution. Furthermore, when lexicographic degeneracy resolution is used the algorithm 
will depend on the order of the rows (or equivalently the order of the powers in the lexico-
graphic covering vector), so randomly permuting the payoff matrices is another possibility 
for achieving good expected running times. 
A related paper is Megiddo (1985), which discusses how the parametric self-dual 
simplex method with different starting points, which corresponds to Lemke's algorithm 
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with different covering vectors, can reproduce seemingly different algorithms, such as the 
variable dimension algorithm of van der Heyden (1980). 
A different open problem is how to generate "numerically stable" game matrices with 
our construction. We use cyclic polytopes, using points on the moment curve, which give 
rise to notoriously ill-conditioned matrices. As a consequence, numerical problems arise 
when the pivoting steps are implemented using floating-point arithmetic. It would be good 
to have "hard instances" of games without this additional complication. These numerical 
problems may possibly be avoided by using points on the so-called trigonometric moment 
curve (see Ziegler (1995, p. 75f) or Griinbaum (2003, p. 67)). An open question is the 
required numerical accuracy of these points. 
The recent claim by Chen and Deng (2005b) that NASH is PPAD-complete, in con-
junction with the results of Hirsch, Papadimitriou, and Vavasis (1989), suggests that is 
unlikely that a polynomial-time algorithm exists for NASH. In any case, since not even 
a subexponential algorithm is known for NASH, the existence of such an algorithm is an 
intriguing open question. 
A well-known open problem is the following: Given a matrix M and a vector q, ei-
ther find a solution to the LCP (M, q), or display a proof that M is not a P-matrix. This 
problem is, like NASH, in PPAD; the reduction to END OF THE LINE uses Lemke's al-
gorithm, which will find a solution to the LCP (M, q) if M is a P-matrix (ray termination 
proves that M is not a P-matrix). As for any problem in TFNP, if the problem is NP-
hard then NP = co-NP (Megiddo (1988) and Megiddo and Papadimitriou (1991)). The 
computational complexity of this problem is an intriguing open question. Is this problem 
PPAD-complete? The problem of deciding if a matrix is not a P-matrix is NP-complete 
(Coxson (1994)). 
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Appendix A 
A.1 Generating game matrices for F(d,d) 
In this appendix, we describe how to obtain games from representations of cyclic poly-
topes. In principle, this has already been described in Proposition 2.1 of von Stengel 
(1999) for general polytopes. In our case, as well as in the construction of games with a 
large number of equilibria in von Stengel (1999), the polytopes are dual cyclic polytopes 
in dimension d with 2d facets, with a labelling of the facets of each polytope that has a 
certain structure. This structure allows a further simplification: Only one of dual cyclic 
polytopes, say P, has to be brought into the form (2.4), where d of the inequalities are 
simply nonnegativities and the other d inequalities define the payoff matrix of one player, 
here B. The other polytope, and thus the payoff matrix A of the other player, is then sim-
ply obtained by a suitable permutation of the rows and columns of BT . We first explain 
this construction, which is summarized in Proposition A.1 below. 
Secondly, we apply this to a representation of cyclic polytopes in dimension d = 
6 derived from the so-called trigonometric moment curve. In this low dimension, the 
coordinates on that curve can be approximated by small integers, which gives rise to 
small game matrix entries. 
As indicated at the beginning of Section 3.2, a standard way of obtaining a cyclic poly-
tope in dimension d with 2d vertices is, first, to consider 2d points ,u(ti) on the moment 
(t t2 td )T for curve p: t 	, , 	 1 < i <2d. Suppose that ti < t2 < • • < t2d. Then the 
vertices of that polytope are characterized by the 0-1 strings fulfilling the Gale evenness 
condition. The polar (or dual) polytope (see see Ziegler (1995) or Griinbaum (2003)) is 
obtained by translating the polytope so that it has the origin 0 in its interior, for exam- 
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ple by subtracting the arithmetic mean p of the points ,u(ti) from each such point. The 
resulting vectors ci = a/J(0-p then define the polar cyclic polytope 
P'={zERd IcTz< 1, 1 <i<2d}. 	 (A.1) 
As described in von Stengel (1999, p. 560), if P' = {z E Rd Cz < 1, Dz < 1 } with d x d 
matrices C and D, then an affine transformation of P' is given by 
P.{xElle lx> 0, -DC-lx<r}, 	r=1.-DC-1 1. 	(A.2) 
Since 0 is a vertex of the simple polytope P, the vector r is positive, and the second d 
inequalities in (A.2) can be re-normalized so that the right hand side is one. With the 
diagonal matrix S with entries s« = 1/r1 with r as in (A.2), and sib = 0 for i j, we can 
rewrite (A.2) as 
P={xERd 	0, -SDC-lx< 1}. 	 (A.3) 
Affine transformations leave the combinatorial structure (that is, the face incidences) 
of a polytope unchanged, so P is a dual cyclic polytope with vertices characterized by 
Gale evenness strings. These Gale evenness strings refer to the 2d inequalities defining P 
according to the ordering in (A.3), that is, xi > 0 being the first inequality obtained from 
the first point p(ti) on the moment curve, x2 > 0 corresponding to p(t2), and so on. 
Consider the polytope Q defined by 
Q= { E 	—spc- ly <1, > ol , 	 (A.4) 
which is identical to P in (A.3) except that the first and last d inequalities are interchanged. 
In a dual cyclic polytope like P in (A.3), each inequality defines a facet (obtained 
by converting the inequality to an equality). We say that a facet of P has label k (for 
k = 1,...,2d) if it corresponds to the kth inequality in the description of the polytope 
in (A.3). Similarly, a facet of Q has label k if it corresponds to the kth inequality in (A.4). 
If P and D in (A.3) and (A.4) are the polytopes P and Q in (2.4), they define a symmetric 
bimatrix game with payoff matrices (A, B) where BT = A = -SDC-1 . 
The vertices of a dual cyclic polytope are given by the sets of d facets each vertex 
lies on. Encoded as bitstrings, these sets are characterized by the Gale evenness condition 
explained at the beginning of Section 3.2, with G(d) as the set of these bitstrings. We 
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assume d is even. Then the Gale evenness condition is preserved by a cyclic rotation of 
the bitstrings, in particular by d positions, as used in the definition (A.4) of Q. Thus, 
the vertices of both P and 0 correspond to the Gale evenness strings in the set G(d). A 
bitstring u in G(d) defines the vertex x of P obtained by converting the kth inequality in 
(A.3) to an equality whenever uk = 1, for k = 1, . . . , 2d. In the same manner, v in G(d) 
defines the vertex y of Q where the kth inequality in (A.4) is binding whenever vk = 1. 
In our construction, as well as in von Stengel (1999), the polytopes P and Q in (2.4) 
are dual cyclic polytopes but the games are not symmetric, because the facets of Q are 
not labelled in their original order. Instead, a certain permutation X is used to obtain Q 
from Q, by letting the kth facet of Q in the description (A.4) have label k(k) in Q, for 
k = 1, , 2d. In our construction, we used the permutation X = 1' defined in (3.3). With 
X(S) = {2 (k) I k E S} for S C 1, , 2d, this permutation has the property 
24{1,...,4) = 	 (A.5) 
(and thus 24{d -I- 1, , 2d}) = {d + 1, , 2d}). This condition implies that the pair 
(u, v) = e0 in (3.4) is complementary. The corresponding vertex pair of P x Q is the 
artificial equilibrium (0,0). (Property (A.5) also implies that el in Lemma 3.3 is comple-
mentary, which defines the completely mixed equilibrium.) 
The following proposition describes the construction of a bimatrix game (A, B) using 
P in (A.3), and Q defined by Q in (A.4) with labels given by a permutation 2 fulfilling 
(A.5). The proposition shows how to obtain A from B T by permuting rows and columns 
suitably. 
Proposition A.1 Consider a pair of dual cyclic polytopes in dimension d with 2d facets, 
with each vertex set represented by the set of Gale evenness strings G(d). Let X, be a 
permutation of { 1, . , 2d} that fulfills (A.5). For k = 1, . . . , 2d, a vertex u in G(d) of the 
first polytope has the labels k where uk = 1, a vertex v in G(d) of the second polytope has 
the labels k(k) where vk = 1. A vertex pair (u, v) is complementary if it has all labels. 
Then a d x d bimatrix game (A,B) with Nash equilibria corresponding to complementary 
vertex pairs, where the artificial equilibrium corresponds to eo in (3.4), is given by BT = 
—SDC-1 as in (A.3), using a representation (A.1) of a dual cyclic polytope consistent 
with the Gale evenness ordering. The matrix entries a(i, j) of A are obtained from the 
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matrix entries b(i, j) of B by 
a(X(i),X(j d) — d) = b(j , 	(1 < i , j < d). 	 (A.6) 
Proof: For the characterization of equilibria, the combinatorial structure of the dual cyclic 
polytopes suffices, as given by the Gale evenness strings G(d). Both P in (A.3) and Q 
in (A.4) are representations of such polytopes. By assumption, for k = 1, . . . , 2d, the kth 
inequality of (A.3) has label k, and the kth inequality of (A.4) has label X(k). 
Let BT = —SDC-1 , define the matrix A with entries a(i, j) by (A.6), and let 
Q={yERd lAy<1, y>0}. 	 (A.7) 
The polytopes P and Q in (A.3), (A.7) correspond to the bimatrix game (A,B), as in (2.4). 
The facets of Q have labels in the order of the inequalities in (A.7). It suffices to show 
that these labels k correspond to the labels X(k) of Q stated above. 
In detail, the inequalities in (A.4) are 
= E Rd 1 E b(j,i) < 
j=1 
yi > 0 
(1 < i < d), 
(1 < j 	} 
(A.8) 
For 1 < j < d, the (d j)th inequality in (A.8) has label X(d j). Hence, it should appear 
as the X(d j)th inequality in (A.7), which by (A.5) is the inequality ygd+ j)—d > 0. This 
is achieved by the correspondence between y in (A.7) and y in (A.8) given by ygd+i)—d = 
3-7i• 
The ith of the first d inequalities in (A.8), for 1 < i < d, has label X(i). It should appear 
as the k(i)th inequality in (A.7). That inequality has the form 
d 
E a(240 1 ) Y1 < 1  
1=1 
which by (A.5) can be rewritten as 
d E a(A..(i) ,24d j) — d) Ygd+ j)—d 1 
 j=1 
which by (A.6) is the ith inequality of (A.8) as claimed. 
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Consider the following 6 x 6 bimatrix game (A, B) with 
—180 72 —333 297 —153 270 72 36 17 —3 —36 —153 
—30 17 —33 42 —3 20 —180 —81 —30 20 90 270 
—81 36 —126 126 —36 90 297 126 42 —33 —126 —333 
A = B = 
90 —36 126 —126 36 —81 —333 —126 —33 42 126 297 
20 —3 42 —33 17 —30 270 90 20 —30 —81 —180 
270 —153 297 —333 72 —180 —153 —36 —3 17 36 72 
The matrix A is obtained from B via (A.6) with X = // in (3.3). The matrix B is obtained 
as in Proposition A.1. The underlying representation (A.1), however, is not based on 
points (t, t2 , t3 , t4 , t5 , t6 ) of the moment curve, but on points v (t) of the trigonometric 
moment curve, v (t) = (cos t, sin t, cos 2t, sin 2t, cos 3t, sin 3t). These points also give rise 
to cyclic polytopes (see Ziegler (1995, p. 75f) or Griinbaum (2003, p. 67)). For t = iic/6 
for i = 1, . . . , 12, the first pair of coordinates of v (t) denote the vertices of a regular 12-gon, 
the second pair those of a regular hexagon, used twice, and the third pair those of a square, 
used three times. The origin is in the interior of the convex hull of these vertices, so the 
polytope does not have to be translated to obtain its polar. The combinatorial structure is 
preserved by choosing suitable integer coordinates near the points on the circle, which are 
shown in Figure A.1; payoffs have been multiplied by 18 to obtain integers. (The square 
is represented perfectly; choosing as its vertices instead the points (1, 0), (0, 1), (-1, 0), 
(0, —1), say, would not change B as the affine transformation that produces (A.2) always 
gives the unit vectors as the normal vectors of the first d facets of P.) It is an open problem 
to find suitable approximations with small integers in higher dimensions that preserve the 
combinatorial structure. 
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The bimatrix game (A', B) with 
—81 36 —126 126 —36 90 
—180 72 —333 297 —153 270 
20 —3 42 —33 17 —30 
A' = 
—30 17 —33 42 —3 20 
270 —153 297 —333 72 —180 
90 —36 126 —126 36 —81 
is obtained from the permutation A,(k) = k — (-1)k for 1 < k < 12 in (A.6). This permu-
tation is used in von Stengel (1999), and the game (44',B) has 75 equilibria. 
Figure A.1 Approximation of points on the trigonometric moment curve by small integers. The 
circled numbers refer to the labels i = 1, ,12 of the vertices, which become facets 
in the dual cyclic polytope P. 
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A.2 Examples of path lengths and paths 
The following figures show the empirical evidence leading to Theorems 3.9, 3.10, and 
3.15. Figure A.2 shows the path lengths and their exponential growth, and that the lengths 
of the short paths n(d, 3d/2) for d = 2, 4, 6, ... are given by the Fibonacci numbers times 
two, with every third Fibonacci number omitted. Figures A.5, A.9, A.8, (which appeared 
in a different format in Section 3 as Figures 3.3, 3.5, and 3.4 respectively) and A.10 
illustrate Theorem 3.9, and Figures 8, 13, and 14 show cases of Theorem 3.10. 
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A.2.1 LH path lengths for F(d, d) and F(d, 2d) 
r(d,d) 
label d 
2 4 6 8 10 
1 4 20 88 376 1596 
2 4 8 24 92 380 
3 4 8 24 92 380 
4 4 20 24 40 108 
5 10 24 40 108 
6 10 88 92 108 
7 10 36 92 108 
8 10 36 376 380 
9 16 146 380 
10 16 146 1596 
11 36 42 612 
12 36 42 612 
13 42 152 
14 42 152 
15 146 68 
16 146 68 
17 152 
18 152 
19 612 
20 612 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
r(d, 2d) 
label d 
2 4 6 8 10 
1 4 20 88 376 1596 
2 4 8 24 92 380 
3 5 8 24 92 380 
4 4 20 24 40 108 
5 4 21 24 40 108 
6 5 10 88 92 108 
7 21 89 92 108 
8 10 36 376 380 
9 10 89 377 380 
10 21 16 146 1596 
11 10 89 377 1597 
12 21 36 42 612 
13 36 377 1597 
14 89 42 152 
15 16 377 1597 
16 89 146 68 
17 36 146 1597 
18 89 377 152 
19 42 1597 
20 377 612 
21 42 612 
22 377 1597 
23 146 152 
24 377 1597 
25 68 
26 1597 
27 152 
28 1597 
29 612 
30 1597 
Figure A.2 LH path lengths of r(d, d) and I'(d, 2d) for different missing labels. 
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A.2.2 Sample LH paths for 1"(d, d) 
In the following figures, each row displays two pivoting steps, one in P and one in Q, so 
the number of the last row is to be multiplied by two to obtain the path length. 
	
1 2 3 4 	1 2 4 3 
01 1 	0„, 1 1 
1 pill 
2 	 ' 	1 1 	1 1 
Figure A.3 The path n(2, 1) 
1 2 3 4 1 2 4 3 
0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 1 
Figure A.4 The path n(2, 4) 
http://www.jizzonline.com/ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 	1 3 2 4 6 5 8 7 
0 	111 4 000 l 0000i 1 1 1 
1 	1 1 1 ligoo 	;00011 	1 1 
2 	1 1 ■ 1 1; o 0 	0 o 1 1 	1 1 
3 1 1 1 161 , o 	0 1 1 1 1 
4 	1 1 1 1;.0 	o 1 1 	1 1 
5 1 1 	1 11, 0 	0 1 1 1 	1 1 
6 	1 1 	1 1 liat 	0 0I 1 1 1 1 
7 	1 1 1 1 1 1 	1 1 
8 	0 d 1 1 	1 1 	1 111 1P0 0 
9 	0 0 d11 	11 	1 1 1 1r0 0 0 
10 	o o o A: 1 1 1 1 	1 1 1 110 0 0 0 
Figure A.5 The path n(4, I ) 
101 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 	8 1 	3 	2 	4 	6 	5 	8 	7 
0 1 	1 	1 	1 	0 	0 	0 	0 0 	00 	0 	1 	1 	1 	1 
1 1 	1 	1 	0 	0 	0 	0 	1 1 	0 	00110 	1 
2 0 	1 	1 	0 	0 	011 11001100 
3 1 	1 	0 	0 	0 	011 011011 	0 	0 
4 1 	0 	0 	0 	0 	1 	1 	1 0 	1 	1 	0 	0 	1 	1 	0 
5 1 	1 	0 	0 	0110 1 	1 	0 	0 	0 	1 	1 	0 
6 011001 	1 	0 1 	0 	0 	1 	1 	1 
7 0110 	1 	1 	0 	0 11 	00011 
8 1 	1 	o 	o 	1 	1 	o 	0 111 	1 	1 	0 	0 	0 	1 	1 
9 1 	0 	0 	0 	1 	1 	0 	1 1 	1 	1 	0 	0 	0 	0 	1 
10 0 	0 	0 	0 	1 	1 	1 	1 11 	1 	1 	0000 
Figure A.6 The path 744,4) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 3 2 4 6 5 8 7 
0 	111 1 o o o 	o 	11 11 
1 	ill 1 y 00 o 	1 00 	11 	1 
2 	1 1111 
 3 1 1 1 1 1 	
1 14 1 1 	1 
1 	1 1 	0 0 1 
4 	w0 	•1 1 1 1 	1 1 1 	; 0 o 61 
5 o o 61 1111 	1 1 1 1 0 0 0f 
Figure A.7 The path 7t(4, 8) 
0 
1 
2 
123456789101112 
1 	111 	111§0 	0 	0 	0 	0 
J 0 0 0 0 01 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1y0  
0111111110 	0 	0 	0 
. 
1 
132546871091211 
1'0 
	
1 	111 	1 	1 0 0 0 12 
 111 	1 	0 1 0 ' 0	 	0 	O 
0 	0' 	11 	1 	1 	0 	1 
3 01 	1 	0 	1 	1 	1 	1 	0 	0 	0 1 0 OA 1 	1 	1101 
4 0110 .11111000 10011 1 1 0 	1 
5 011(1,11 	1 	1 	0 	0 	0 1 0 0 11 	11 0 0 	1 
6 01 1 11 	11 	0 	0 	0 1 0 	11 	1 	1 0 01 
7 01 	1 	1 	1 1101 100 
. 
 1 	1 	1 	1 0 0 	1 
8 0 	1 	1 	0 	1 	1 	0 	1 	1 	0 11 1 o 	o A 	1 	1 	1 	1 	0 	o 	a, 	1 
9 011001101100 1 , 0011.110 1 
0 iiiioo °o1 1 /0 01100,111100 1:o 
// 001101111100 1',0111111100001 
12 0 	0 	1 	1 	011 	1 	1 	0 	0 1:0 1 	111111 	0 	0 0 01 
13 0 	0 	1 	1 	11 	11 	0 	0 1 	0 	1 	1 	0111 	0 0 0 	1 
14 0 	0 	0 	1 	111 	11 	0 	0 11 	1 	0 	0 	011 	0 0 01 
15 0 	0 	0 	1 	1 	0 	1 	11 	1 	0 	0 111 	0 	0 	1 	1 	0 	0 0 0 	1 
16 0 	0 	0 	0 	1 	11111 	0 	0 111 	0 	1 	1 	0 	0 	0 0 01 
17 0 	0 	0 	0 	0 	1 	1111 	1 	0 11 	1 	1 	1 	0 	0 	0 	0 0 0 	1 
18 0 	0 	0 	0 	0 	0 	1111 	11 11 	11 	1 	1 	0 	0 	0 0 01 
Figure A.8 The path 746,12) 
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	1 1 	1 1 0 0 	1 1 
1 	1 	1 1 	1 	1 
1 	1 1 	1 	1 	1 
1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 
1 1 
0 1 1 
0 0 1 
0 0 1 
0 0 
0 0 0 . 
0 04 
0 0 1 
0 .4 1 
a 1 1 
1 	1 
1 	1 
1 	1 
1 	1 
1 	1 
1 	1 	1 
1 	1 	1 
1 	1 
1 	1 
1 	1 
1 	1 	1 
1 	1 	1 
1 	1 	1 
1 
1 	1 
1 	1 
1 
1 
1■ 1 1 
1 	1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 	1 1 1 1 1■ 1 1 1 
1 	1 1 1 
1 	1 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 1 1 
1 	1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 
1 	1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 	1 1 1 0 
ill 1 1 0 
1 	1 	1 0 0 
1 	1r0 0 0 
1 	1 
1 	1 
1 	1 
1 	1 
1 	1 
1 	1 
1 	0 
1 	0 
1 	0 
1 	0 
1 	0 
1 	0 
1 	0 
1 
1 	0 
1 	0 
0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
0 	1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 
2 	1 1 1 1■ 
18 	0 0 0 1 1 1 
19 	0 0 	1 1■ 
20 	0 0 	1 1 1 
21 	0 	1 1 1 1 
22 	0 	1 1 	1 
23 1 1 
24 	1 1 
25 	1 1 	1 
26 	1 1 	1 1 
27 	1 1 1 1 
28 	1 1 1 1 
29 	1 1 	1 1 
30 	1 1 	1 
31 	1 1 
32 
33 011 1 	1 
1 	1 	1 	1 34 	0 
' 	1 	1 
35 	0 0 	1 1 1 
36 	0 0 	1 1■ 
37 	0 0 	1 1 
38 	0 0 0 	1 
39 	0 0 0 ' 1 1 
40 	0 0 0 1 1 
41 	0 0 0 1 1 
42 	0 0 0 d 1 1 
43 	0 0 0 0 1 1 
44 	0 0 0 0 0 4 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 
1 1 	 ' 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 0 
1 1 0 
1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
0 1 1 
0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 1 
0, 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 1 
0 0 , 1 1 
1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 	1 1 	1 
5 	1 1 	1 1 
6 	1 1 1 1 
7 	1 1 1 1 
8 	1 1 	1 1 
9 	1 1 	1 
10 	1 1 
11 	0 	1 1 
12 	0s 	1 1 	1 
13 	0 	1 1 1 1 
14 	0 	1 1 1 
15 	0 0 	1 1■ 
16 	0 0 	1 1 
17 , 0 0 0 OA 1 
7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 2 5 4 
- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
6 8 7 10 9 12 11 
1 1 	1 1 	1 	1 
1 1 	1 1 	1 	1 
1 	1 	1 	1 	1 
3 	1 1 	11116000 	000111 111 1 
Figure A.9 The path 7(6,1) 
103 
1 3 2 5 4 7 6 8 10 9 12 11 14 13 16 15 
0 	0 	 111111 	1 	1 
10 
1000 	
111111 	1 
1 	111 
1000 1111411 
1 000 	 1001101 
1000O61 	 0 10011 -, 1 
1 0 0 OA 1 001101 
100 	11 	 0001101 
1 0 0 - 	1 	1 1 	0 0 0 1 	1 	0 1 
100 	11 	11001101 
10011 	 11001101 
10011 1 	1'0001101 
1 	0 0 	1 	1 	1 	1 	0 0 011 111  
1001111 0001101 
1001111 	001100.1 
10011141 00110 	ti., 	1 
1001 1 	1! 0 0 1 	1 0 0  1 
1001100 	11011001• 
100011 	11011001 
1 0 0 0 1 1 	1 0 :0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 1 	1 	1 	1 	'0 0 1 	1 0 0 1 
. r 
1000 a 1 11 , 0 0 1 1 0 0 1  1 
1 0 0 0 6 1 1.i -1011001 
1000 	1111011 o 0 1 
1000 1111110 d 1 
1 	0 	0 	0 	1 	1 	11 	1 	1 	:t o 01 
0A 
0 _ 	1 
, 1, 
1 	1 	1 	1 0 0  0  1 
, 1 1 	1 0 0 0 1 
100 
1 0 0 
100.1111 
100. 	11 	 a, 	
110 o a 1 
1 	0 0 	1 
100 	11 111100 	ti, 	1 
1 	0 0 1 	1 	 1 	1 	1 	1 	0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 	1 1 	11.0 1 	1 	0 0 a 1 
10011 	1 	1 	-0110001 
10011 	1 	1 0110001 
1 0 0 1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	0 0 0 0 1 
1 o o 1 1 1 o o o 1 
1 0 0 1 1 	1 / 	1 0 0 0 0 , 1 
10011 	1111000001 
1001111.11000001 
1 0 0 1 	1 1 1 1 10 0 0 0 0 a 1 
101111111110000 0 01 1 
	
1 el 1 	1 	1 	1. o 0 0 0 0 0 1 -. 1 	0 	1 
101 111E11E000001 
1011 	1111M . 00001 
10 11 0 
1011 
A 
1 	
I li 
, 	, 	__ 
, , 1 0 0 0 1 
0 o 0 
00 1 
1 10110 	11 
1 	0 	1 	1 	1 	1 	 1 	1 	0 0  0  1 
1 	0 	1 	1 1 	1 	1 	1 	0 0 0 1 
10110 	 1100 	1 
1 a , 1 1 	o o 	1 1 	1 	1 0 0 	1 
111 	00 	11110 0 0 1 
1 	11000 	1 	1 	110001 
111,00,A 10001 
1 	1 	1 	(;/ 0 1 	o 	1 	10001 
1 	1 	l'o a 1 	l 	1 	1 	o o o a 1 
111.0 	 100 0 a 1 
1110 1 	100 0 0 1 
, 	1 	1 	0 
1 1 1 0 a 1 	
1 10000 g 1 
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Figure A.10 The path n(8,16) 
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Figure A.11 The path n(10,4) 
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Figure A.12 The path n(10,14) 
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Figure A.13 The path p(4, 1) 
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Figure A.14 The path p(4,4) 
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10 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
11 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1,0 0 0 0 001, 	 1 
1 	1 1 1 	0 0 0 0 0 0 	1 1 	1 
2 .11 1 	0 0 0 0 0 Gl- 1 1 1 1 	1 
0 	1 1 1 1 o o o o o o oll o oAll 1 
Figure A.15 The path p(4,5) 
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Figure A.16 The path p(4, 12) 
A.2.4 Lemke path lengths for Morris's construction 
Morris's construction was for both even and odd dimension; here we only give path 
lengths for even dimension. 
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Figure A.17 Lemke path lengths for Morris's construction in even dimension. 
A.2.5 Sample Lemke paths for Morris's construction 
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1 	1 	1 	1 
Figure A.18 The Lemke path of Morris in dimension 4 with missing label 1. 
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Figure A.19 The Lemke path of Morris in dimension 6 with missing label 1. 
A.3 Number of equilibria of games 1"(d, 2d) 
The figure and formulas in this section are from von Stengel (1999), and are given here for 
convenience; see Lemma 3.14. In Figure A.20 we give the values of a and ifr(l) for small 
values of d = 21, which correspond to the number of equilibria in the games F(d, 2d). 
d 0 2 4 	6 	8 	10 	12 	14 	16 
a(1) 
6(0 
1 3 13 63 321 	1683 8989 48639 265729 
3.4 13.8 65.5 330.4 1722.6 9165.3 49456.6 269636.8 
  
Figure A.20 The first values of a(1) and er(1), where a(1) is the number of equilibria in a game 
r(d,2d), 1 = d/2, and a(1) an asymptotic approximation of a(/) from von Stengel 
(1999). 
Now we reproduce the corresponding equations for a(1) and a(/). The first is (3.6) 
from von Stengel (1999), and the second appears on page 566 of the same paper, without 
an equation number. 
am = i  (/ + k)! 	v, (1 + k) ( 1 
k=oldk! (1 — k) ! 1-.7O 	k ) k,k) ' 
1 + \/, (1 + Nii) 2n 
a(n) ' ei(n)  := 25/4rn 	1/71 	• 
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Index of Symbols 
Symbol 	Description 	 Page 
0 	column vector of all Os 	 19 
1 	column vector of all ls 	 19 
A(d) 	subpath of LH path rt(d, 1) 	 39 
A, B 	payoff matrices for player 1 and 2 	 17 
13 (d) 	subpath of LH path n(d, 2d) 	 35 
C 	payoff or cost matrix for player 1 in a symmetric game 	18 
C(d) 	subpath of LH path n(d, l) 	 39 
d 	 dimension (also see next entry) 	 18 
d 	 covering vector for Lemke's algorithm (also see previous entry) 71 
ek 	 unit vector, with component k equal to 1, and all others 0 	68 
F 	LCP map 	 79 
G(d, f) 	set of Gale even bitstrings of length f with d ones 	 31 
G(d) 	abbreviates G(d, 2d) 	 33 
F(m, n) 	m x n double cyclic polytope game 	 32 
FM(d) 	d x d symmetric game derived from Morris's construction 	57 
I 	 identity matrix 	 71 
X 	permutation of labels 	 95 
1(k) 	facet labelling function 	 32 
1' (k) 	facet labelling function 	 32 
/"(k) 	facet labelling function 	 61 
L(d, k) 	length of LH path for r(d,d) with missing label k 	 33 
LCP (M,q) linear complementarity problem with rhs q and matrix M 	20 
M 	LCP matrix 	 20 
Mi 	ith column of matrix M 	 79 
M(d, k) 	length of LH path for r(d, 2d) with missing label k 	 50 
n 	 LCP dimension 	 20 
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pi/ 	dual cyclic polytope 	 31 
P, Q 	best response polytopes P and Q 	 22 
n(d,k) 	the LH path for F(d, d) with missing label k 	 33 
q 	 LCP rhs 	 20 
P (d, i) 	the LH path for F(d, 2d) with missing label j 	 51 
T(d) 	triple imitation game in dimension d 	 60 
S 	 best response polytope for symmetric game 	 18 
u, v 	bitstrings 	 32 
w 	LCP vector of slack variables 	 20 
W 	best response polyhedron for symmetric game defined by costs 68 
z 	LCP vector of variables 	 20 
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